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The dramatic increase of service quality and channel capacity in wireless net-
works is severely limited by the scarcity of energy and bandwidth, which are the
two fundamental resources for communications. New communications and network-
ing paradigms such as cooperative communication and cognitive radio networks
emerged in recent years that can intelligently and efficiently utilize these scarce re-
sources. With the development of these new techniques, how to design efficient spec-
trum allocation and sharing schemes becomes very important, due to the challenges
brought by the new techniques. In this dissertation we have investigated several
critical issues in spectrum allocation and sharing and address these challenges.
Due to limited network resources in a multiuser radio environment, a partic-
ular user may try to exploit the resources for self-enrichment, which in turn may
prompt other users to behave the same way. In addition, cognitive users are able to
make intelligent decisions on spectrum usage and communication parameters based
on the sensed spectrum dynamics and other users’ decisions. Thus, it is important
to analyze the intelligent behavior and complicated interactions of cognitive users
via game-theoretic approaches. Moreover, the radio environment is highly dynamic,
subject to shadowing/fading, user mobility in space/frequency domains, traffic vari-
ations, and etc. Such dynamics brings a lot of overhead when users try to optimize
system performance through information exchange in real-time. Hence, statistical
modeling of spectrum variations becomes essential in order to achieve near-optimal
solutions on average.
In this dissertation, we first study a stochastic modeling approach for dynamic
spectrum access. Since the radio spectrum environment is highly dynamic, we model
the traffic variations in dynamic spectrum access using continuous-time Markov
chains that characterizes future traffic patterns, and optimize access probabilities
to reduce performance degradation due to co-channel interference. Second, we pro-
pose an evolutionary game framework for cooperative spectrum sensing with selfish
users, and develop the optimal collaboration strategy that has better performance
than fully cooperating strategy. Further, we study user cooperation enforcement
for cooperative networks with selfish users. We model the optimal relay selection
and power control problem as a Stackelberg game, and consider the joint benefits
of source nodes as buyers and relay nodes as sellers. The proposed scheme achieves
the same performance compared to traditional centralized optimization while reduc-
ing the signaling overhead. Finally, we investigate possible attacks on cooperative
spectrum sensing under the evolutionary sensing game framework, and analyze their
damage both theoretically and by simulations.
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The dramatic increase of service quality and channel capacity in wireless net-
works is severely limited by the scarcity of energy and bandwidth, which are the
two fundamental resources for communications. Therefore, researchers are currently
focusing their attention on new communications and networking paradigms that can
intelligently and efficiently utilize these scarce resources. For instance, cooperative
communications [LTW04] can take advantage of the broadcasting nature of wire-
less networks and exploit the inherent spatial and multiuser diversities, where relay
nodes act as a virtual antenna array to help source nodes forward information to
the destination nodes to achieve higher data throughput and more reliable transmis-
sion. Moreover, with the development of cognitive radio technology [III00], future
wireless communication devices are envisioned to be able to sense and analyze their
surrounding environment, learn from the environment variations, and adapt their
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operating parameters accordingly in order for a better performance and more ef-
ficient spectrum utilization. For instance, when cognitive network users share a
licensed spectrum, they can detect spectrum white space, select the best frequency
bands, coordinate spectrum access with other users and vacate the frequency when
a primary user appears.
In traditional military and emergency applications, users in a wireless net-
work usually belong to the same authority and have the same objective. However,
in emerging networks, such as cooperative and cognitive communication networks
envisioned in civilian applications, different network users typically belong to dif-
ferent operators and may pursue different goals. Fully cooperative behaviors such
as forwarding data for other users or contributing to a common task uncondition-
ally cannot be pre-assumed. Due to limited network resources in a multiuser radio
environment, a particular user may try to exploit the resources for self-enrichment,
which in turn may prompt other users to behave the same way. Moreover, the ra-
dio environment is highly dynamic, subject to shadowing/fading, user mobility in
space/frequency domains, traffic variations, and etc. Such dynamics brings a lot
of overhead when users try to optimize system performance through information
exchange in real-time.
Since these emerging communication paradigms are usually deployed in a
highly dynamic spectrum environment where network users tend to be selfish, before
they can be successfully exploited in order to achieve efficient spectrum utilization,
the following two critical issues must be resolved first: user cooperation and dy-
namic spectrum sharing. Since selfish network users only aim at maximizing their
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own benefits, without a properly designed cooperation enforcement mechanism, they
may be unwilling to help other users at the expense of their own resources, such
as forward data for other users or spend their own time detecting spectrum white
space. Furthermore, dynamics caused by different user activities, e.g., primary users
re-occupying/vacating their licensed bands and secondary users starting/ceasing a
communication session, pose even greater challenges for the design of dynamic spec-
trum sharing schemes.
In recent years, efficient spectrum allocation and sharing in cooperative and
cognitive communication networks has drawn extensive attentions [CZ05, ZC05,
EPT07, JL07, JL06, RYM05, SA06]. The performance in cooperative communica-
tion networks depends on careful resource allocations such as relay placement, re-
lay selection, bandwidth allocation, and transmission power control. Transmission
power allocation is optimized to minimize the outage probability and maximize
network lifetime [HA03, SSL08]. Relay selection and assignment schemes are pro-
posed to fully utilize the cooperative diversity, minimize the outage probability,
extend coverage area, and maximize throughput [LBG+04,BLR05, SHL06]. In ad-
dition, there have been several previous efforts addressing how to efficiently and
fairly share the spectrum resources in cognitive communication networks, on a ne-
gotiation/pricing basis [CZ05,ZC05,EPT07,JL07,JL06,RYM05] or an opportunistic
basis [XCMS06,KC06]. In negotiation/pricing-based spectrum allocation, the un-
used spectrum resources from legacy spectrum holders (primary users) can be shared
among unlicensed users through auction-based pricing approaches. In opportunis-
tic spectrum sharing, unlicensed/secondary users can access the licensed spectrum
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when the spectrum is sensed as idle. Furthermore, in order to protect primary users
from the interference due to secondary spectrum usage, various spectrum detection
schemes have been proposed to improve the detection performance and minimize
the conflict/interference with the primary user. Recent study has shown that co-
operative spectrum sensing with multiple secondary users can further improve the
efficiency of primary user detection.
Although the existing spectrum allocation and sharing schemes can enhance
system performance in cooperative and cognitive communication networks, there
are still some fundamental issues that require further treatment.
First, the radio spectrum environment is constantly changing. In conventional
power control to manage mutual interference for a fixed number of secondary users,
after each change of the number of contending secondary users, the network needs
to re-optimize the power allocation for all users completely. This results in high
complexity and much overhead. If a primary user appears in some specific portion
of the spectrum, secondary users in that band also need to adapt their transmission
parameters to avoid interfering with the primary user. Therefore, efficient dynamic
spectrum sharing scheme must include a traffic model based on traffic statistics to
predict the future traffic patterns in the shared spectrum.
Second, in order to improve the detection performance of a primary user,
most cooperative spectrum sensing schemes assume a fully cooperative scenario,
meaning all secondary user will voluntarily fuse their sensing outcomes to a common
controller such as a secondary base station. But this assumption does not hold in a
decentralized network. Moreover, due to users’ specific channel conditions, it is even
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not optimal to have all secondary users cooperate in every sensing effort. In addition,
sensing takes energy/time which may be diverted to useful data transmission. In
self-organizing networks where secondary users exchange sensory data to make a
final decision, selfish users tend to take advantage of the others so as to reserve
more time for their own data transmission. Therefore, how to collaborate with
selfish users in cooperative spectrum sensing is another very important issue.
Third, most existing works on spectrum sharing in cooperative communication
networks mainly focus on resource allocation by means of a centralized fashion.
Such schemes require that complete and precise channel state information (CSI) be
available in order to optimize the system performance, which are generally neither
scalable nor robust to channel estimation errors. Moreover, users in decentralized
self-organizing cooperative communication networks belong to different authorities.
Therefore, a mechanism of reimbursement to relay nodes is needed such that relay
nodes can earn benefits from spending their own transmission power in helping the
source node forward information.
1.2 Contributions and Thesis Organization
This dissertation has investigated how to efficiently utilize the limited network
resources in cognitive cooperative networks with selfish users under a time-varying
spectrum radio environment. Specifically, two important issues have been addressed:
1) how to collaborate with selfish users in forwarding information and cooperative
spectrum sensing, and 2) how to design dynamic spectrum access strategy by uti-
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lizing the traffic statistics to predict future traffic patterns and reduce information
exchange. The contributions lie in the following three aspects.
Evolution of behavior dynamics in cooperative spectrum sensing: In
order to study the time evolution of selfish users’ cooperation behavior, we have
proposed an evolutionary cooperative sensing game, derived users’ behavior dynam-
ics, and proved their convergence to the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The
proposed approach not only reveals the underlying behavior dynamics involved in
establishing robust equilibrium, but also helps to develop a distributed learning
algorithm that guides secondary users to approach the ESS only with their own
throughput observation. More important, it opens a new avenue for future research
on studying behavior dynamics in cognitive radio networks using evolutionary game
theory.
Statistical modelling for dynamic spectrum access: Another contribu-
tion of this dissertation is the traffic modelling of primary and secondary users in
cognitive radio networks. Specifically, we have modelled the traffic variations of the
radio environment as continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC). Since the model can
characterize the traffic dynamics of different users occupying the licensed spectrum,
the proposed approach provides a means for predicting future traffic patterns in
the shared spectrum. As mutual interference will impair spectrum efficiency when
multiple secondary users transmit in the same frequency, in order to compensate
throughput degradation due to mutual interference, we have further introduced op-
timal access probabilities for secondary users so that the chance of spectrum sharing
is controlled and spectrum resources are shared in a more efficient way without con-
6
flicting with primary users.
User cooperation enforcement in cooperative networks: In this dis-
sertation, we have also proposed a two-level Stackelberg game which considers the
joint benefits of source nodes as buyers and relay nodes as sellers. With the pro-
posed approach, not only can source nodes and relays at relatively better locations
and buy an optimal amount of power, but also competing relays can maximize their
profits by asking optimal prices. Furthermore, we have designed a distributed price
updating function by which relay nodes can iteratively approach their optimal prices
and system performance is gradually optimized. Compared to most existing works,
the proposed approach does not require CSI, and therefore greatly reduces overhead
and signaling. Moreover, the distributed nature of the proposed scheme makes it a
building block in large-scale wireless ad hoc networks for the cooperation simulation
among nodes.
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
the related works, game-theoretic models, and basic concepts of Markov chain for
spectrum allocation and sharing in cognitive cooperative networks. In Chapter 3,
a primary-prioritized Markov approach is described for dynamic spectrum access
in licensed bands [WJLC09]. In Chapter 4, an evolutionary game framework for
cooperative spectrum sensing with selfish users is discussed [WLC09]. The user
collaboration enforcement in cooperative wireless networks using Stackelberg game
[WHL09] is presented in Chapter 5. Malicious attacks on cooperative spectrum
sensing are studied in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and





2.1.1 Spectrum Sharing and Management in Cognitive Ra-
dios
The usage of radio spectrum resources and the regulation of radio emissions are
coordinated by national regulatory bodies like the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC). The FCC assigns spectrum to license holders or services on a long-
term basis for large geographical regions; however, a large portion of the assigned
spectrum remains unutilized. The inefficient usage of the limited spectrum resources
necessitates the development of dynamic spectrum access techniques. Recently, the
FCC began considering more flexible and comprehensive uses of the available spec-
trum [FCC02, FCC03b], through the use of cognitive radio technology [III00]. By
exploiting the spectrum in an opportunistic fashion, dynamic spectrum access en-
8
ables secondary users to sense which portions of the spectrum are available, select
the best channel, coordinate access to spectrum channels with other users, and
vacate the channel when a primary user appears.
In order to fully utilize the limited spectrum resources, how to efficiently and
fairly share the spectrum among secondary users becomes an important issue, es-
pecially when multiple dissimilar secondary users coexist in the same portion of the
spectrum band. There have been several previous efforts addressing this issue on a
negotiated/pricing basis [CZ05,ZC05,EPT07,JL07,JL06,RYM05] or an opportunis-
tic basis [XCMS06,KC06]. A local bargaining mechanism was proposed in [CZ05] to
distributively optimize the efficiency of spectrum allocation and maintain bargaining
fairness among secondary users. In [HBH06], auction mechanisms were proposed for
sharing spectrum among multiple users such that the interference was controlled be-
low a certain level. Rule-based approaches were proposed in [ZC05] that regulated
users’ spectrum access in order to trade-off fairness and utilization with commu-
nication costs and algorithmic complexity. In [EPT07], the authors proposed a
repeated game approach, in which the spectrum sharing strategy could be enforced
using the Nash Equilibrium of dynamic games. In [JL07, JL06], belief-assisted dy-
namic pricing was used to optimize the overall spectrum efficiency while basing the
participating incentives of the selfish users on double auction rules. A centralized
spectrum server was considered in [RYM05] to coordinate the transmissions of a
group of wireless links sharing a common spectrum. Recently, attention is being
drawn to opportunistic spectrum sharing. In [XCMS06], a distributed random ac-
cess protocol was proposed to achieve airtime fairness between dissimilar secondary
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users in open spectrum wireless networks without considering primary users’ activ-
ities. The work in [KC06] examined the impact of secondary user access patterns
on blocking probability and achievable improvement in spectrum utilization with
statistical multiplexing, and proposed a feasible spectrum sharing scheme.
2.1.2 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing for Primary Detection
In order to identify the spectrum hole when the primary is inactive, an impor-
tant requirement of secondary users is the capability to sense their surrounding radio
spectrum environment. Further, since primary users should be carefully protected
from interference due to secondary users’ operation, secondary users also need to
sense the licensed spectrum before each transmission and can only transmit when the
spectrum is idle. One efficient way of spectrum detection is the primary transmitter
detection based on local observations of secondary users. If the information of the
primary user signal is known to secondary users, they can use matched filter detec-
tion to maximize the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) under stationary Gaussian
noise [SC05]. Another detection approach is the cyclostationary feature detection
which analyzes the spectral correlation function of modulated signals [FGR05]. Al-
though these two types of detection schemes can achieve precise detection, they
either require priori knowledge of the primary user signal, or have high complexity.
A good alternative is energy detection.
Energy detection is suitable to the scenario when secondary users cannot
gather sufficient information about the primary user signal. An energy detector
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collects locally observed signal samples within a certain time, measures the signal
energy, and compare the energy with a threshold to determine whether a primary
user is present or not [SC05]. However, energy detection is heavily affected by noise
uncertainty.
Recently, cooperative spectrum sensing with relay nodes’ help and multi-
user collaborative sensing has been shown to greatly improve the sensing perfor-
mance [GS05, MSB06, GL07, PL07, LYZH07, VJP08, GLBL08]. In [GS05], the au-
thors proposed collaborative spectrum sensing to combat shadowing/fading effects.
The work in [MSB06] proposed light-weight cooperation in sensing based on hard
decisions to reduce the sensitivity requirements. The authors of [GL07] showed that
cooperative sensing can reduce the detection time of the primary user and increase
the overall agility. How to choose proper secondary users for cooperation was in-
vestigated in [PL07]. The authors of [LYZH07] studied the design of sensing slot
duration to maximize secondary users’ throughput under certain constraints. Two
energy-based cooperative detection methods using weighted combining were ana-
lyzed in [VJP08]. Spatial diversity in multiuser networks to improve spectrum sens-
ing capabilities of centralized cognitive radio networks were exploited in [GLBL08].
2.1.3 Relay Selection and Power Control in Cooperative
Networks
The performance in cooperative communication networks depends on care-
ful resource allocation, such as relay placement, relay selection, and power con-
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trol [HA03, SSL08,MY04, LBG+04,BLR05, SHL06,HHSL05, ISSL08, ZAL06,NY07,
SS07, HSHL07, ACM07, LHXS07]. In [HA03], the power allocation was optimized
to satisfy the outage probability criterion. The authors in [SSL08] provided the
analysis on symbol error rates and optimum power allocations for the decode-and-
forward cooperation protocol in wireless networks. The energy-efficient broadcast
problem in wireless networks was considered in [MY04]. The work in [LBG+04]
evaluated the cooperative diversity performance when the best relay was chosen
according to the average SNR, and the outage probability of relay selection based
on instantaneous SNRs. In [BLR05], the authors proposed a distributed relay se-
lection scheme that required limited network knowledge with instantaneous SNRs.
In [SHL06], the relay assignment problem was solved for the multiuser cooperative
communications. In [HHSL05], the cooperative resource allocation for OFDM was
studied. The authors of [ISSL08] investigated the relay selection problem with focus
on when to cooperate and which relay to cooperate with, which required channel
state information (CSI). In [ZAL06], centralized power allocation schemes were pre-
sented by assuming all the relay nodes should help. In order to further minimize the
system outage behaviors and improve the average throughput, a selection forward
protocol was proposed to choose only one “best” relay node to assist transmission.
A centralized resource allocation algorithm for power control, bandwidth allocation,
relay selection and relay strategy choice in an OFDMA-based relay network was
proposed in [NY07]. The work in [SS07] developed distributed power control strate-
gies for multi-hop cooperative transmission schemes. Lifetime extension for wireless
sensor networks with the aid of relay selection and power management schemes was
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investigated in [HSHL07]. The authors of [ACM07] studied the optimal power al-
location problem in the high SNR regime for different relaying protocols. Relay
station placement and relay time allocation in IEEE 802.16j networks was investi-
gated in [LHXS07].
In recent years, some efforts have been made towards mathematical analysis
of cooperation in wireless networking using game theory, since game theory is a
natural and flexible tool that studies how the autonomous network users interact
and cooperate with each other. In game-theoretic literature of wireless networking,
in [MW01], the behaviors of selfish nodes in the case of random access and power
control were examined. In [DPA00], static pricing policies for multiple-service net-
works were proposed. Such policies can offer incentives for each node to choose the
service that best matches its needs, so as to discourage over-allocation of resources
and improve social welfare. The work in [SMG02] presented a power control solution
for wireless data in the analytical setting of a game-theoretic framework. Pricing of
transmit powers was introduced to improve user utilities that reflected the quality
of service a wireless terminal received. A pricing game that stimulated cooperation
via reimbursements to the relay was proposed in [SA06], but there was no detailed
analysis on how to select the best relays and how to achieve the equilibrium dis-




In self-organized wireless networks, users may belong to different operators
and compete for limited network resources, In other words, users are selfish and
only aim at maximizing their own profits by utilizing more resources. With the
rapid development of cognitive radio technique, network users can further make in-
telligent decisions on spectrum usage and communication parameters based on the
sensed spectrum dynamics and other users’ decisions. Moreover, many fundamental
network functionalities, such as packet forwarding, relaying information, and spec-
trum sharing, cannot be performed without relying on cooperation among the selfish
users. In such scenarios, it is no longer feasible to optimize the network performance
by assuming there is a central authority and every user will obey the resource alloca-
tion rule. Therefore, it is natural to study the intelligent behaviors and interactions
of selfish network users from the game-theoretic perspective.
Game theory [FL91,FT93] is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic
interactions among rational decision makers. Three major components in a strategic-
form game model are the set of players, the strategy space of each player, and the
payoff/utility function, which measures the outcome of the game for each player.
In cooperative communication networks, source nodes may need to provide
relay nodes with incentives for relaying their data and relay nodes need to select
the best pricing strategy, which can be modeled as a buyer/seller game [WHL07,
WHL09,SA06,HL08]. In cognitive radio networks, the competition and cooperation
among the cognitive network users can also be well modeled as a spectrum sharing
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game [WWLC09,EPT07,JL07,HBH06,Y. 09,WWJ+08]. Specifically, in open spec-
trum sharing (e.g., [WWLC09,EPT07]), the players are all the secondary users that
compete for unlicensed spectrum; in licensed spectrum sharing, where primary users
lease their unused bands to secondary users, the players include both the primary
and secondary users (e.g., [HBH06,Y. 09,JL06]).
The strategy space for each player may vary according to the specific spectrum
sharing scenario. For instance, in cooperative communication networks, the strategy
space of the source nodes includes which relay to choose for help and the relay power
levels, while the strategy space of the relay nodes are the prices for relaying data.
In open spectrum sharing, the strategy space of secondary users may include the
transmission parameters they want to adopt, such as the transmission powers, access
rates, time duration, etc.; while in licensed spectrum trading, their strategy space
includes which licensed bands they want to rent, and how much they would pay for
leasing those licensed bands. For the primary users, the strategy space may include
which secondary users they would lease each of their unused bands to, and how
much they will charge for each band.
The payoff functions for different users are defined to characterize various
performance criteria accordingly. For instance, in open spectrum sharing, the payoff
function for the secondary users is often defined as a non-decreasing function of the
Quality of Service (QoS) they receive by utilizing the unlicensed band; in licensed
spectrum trading, the payoff function for the users often represents the monetary
gains (e.g., revenue minus cost) by leasing the licensed bands.
In a noncooperative spectrum sharing game with selfish network users, each
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user only targets for maximizing his/her own payoff by choosing an optimal strat-
egy. And the outcome of the noncooperative game is often measured by the Nash
Equilibrium (NE). The NE is defined as the set of strategies for all the users such
that no user can improve his/her payoff by unilaterally deviating from the equilib-
rium strategy, given that the other users adopt the equilibrium strategies. So the
NE indicates that no individual user would have the incentive to choose a different
strategy.
2.2.1 Stackelberg Game
If players choose their strategies simultaneously, the game can be described
using a strategic-form representation [FT93]. In order to model a game with a
dynamic structure, game theorists use the concept of a game in extensive form,
which explicitly states the order in which players move, and what each player knows
when making each of his decisions [FT93]. An example of an extensive-form game
is the Stackelberg game [FT93]. In a Stackelberg game, one player must commit
to a strategy before other players choose their own strategies. Specifically, the
players of a Stackelberg game include a leader and a follower/followers. A leader
commits to a strategy first, and then a follower selfishly optimizes his own reward,
considering the strategy selected by the leader. Compared to Nash games, where
all players take their moves simultaneously, Stackelberg games can better model
the scenario with heterogeneous players that take sequential moves. For example in
cooperative communication networks with self-organized nodes/users, after a source
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node broadcasts his data to a destination node and several relay nodes, the relay
nodes will signal their optimal prices for relaying data to the source node, and the
source node then optimizes the service he purchases from the relay nodes. Thus,
we can use Stackelberg game to model such cooperation, where the source node
is the leader and the relay nodes are the followers. Stackelberg game have been
used to model congestion control [BS02], attacker-defender scenarios in security
domains [PPM+08], network routing [KLO97] and scheduling strategies [Rou01].
2.2.2 Evolutionary Game
There can be more than one NE in a game. When there exist several different
NE, how should a rational player decide which of them is the “right one”? Game the-
orists have proposed different refinement criteria [FT93]; however, each equilibrium
could be justified by some refinement. The problem becomes even more complicated
if the players are uncertain about the game being played and the game involves a
dynamic process. Therefore, evolutionary game theory (EGT) was proposed [Smi82]
to reveal the underlying dynamics and find a robust equilibrium.
The idea of EGT was inspired by the study of ecological biology, and it differs
from classic game theory by focusing on the dynamics of strategy change more than
the properties of strategy equilibrium. EGT was first used to study the adjustment
of population fractions by evolution, which states that the genes whose strategies
are more successful will have higher reproductive fitness. Therefore, the population
fractions of strategies whose payoff against the current distribution of opponents’
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play is relatively high will tend to grow at a faster rate. Since strategies with
lower payoff values are eliminated during the dynamic process, the stable steady
states after the evolution converges must be an NE. But not all NE are locally
stable and robust to mutations. In EGT, the equilibrium strategy is defined as the
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) [Smi82], which is a strategy such that if
all members of the population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the
population under the influence of natural selection. Even if a small part of players
may not be rational and take out-of-equilibrium strategies, ESS is still a locally
stable state.
2.3 Markov Chain
Markov chains are popular models in many application areas, including eco-
nomic systems, queuing theory, and networking. In this section, we focus our at-
tention on the Markov chain in discrete-time domain, and continuous-time Markov
chain can be similarly defined.
A Markov chain is a stochastic process where the probability of the next state
given the current state and the entire past depends only on the current state. Sup-
pose that S = {Xn; n = 1, 2, · · · } is a stochastic process, then {Xn} is a Markov
chain if and only if
Pr(Xn+1 = x|Xn = xn, · · · , X1 = x1) = Pr(Xn+1 = x|Xn = xn), (2.1)
where the countable set of {Xn} represents the state space of the chain. In other
words, the description of the present state fully captures all the information that
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could influence the future evolution of the stochastic process.
Future states will be reached through a probabilistic process instead of a deter-
ministic one. At each step the system may change its state from the current state
to another state, or remain in the same state, according to a certain probability
distribution. The changes of state are called transitions, and the probabilities asso-
ciated with various state-changes are called transition probabilities. If the transition
probability only depends on the current and the next states and not on the time
index of the states, i.e.,
Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) = Pr(Xn = j|Xn−1 = i), (2.2)
then the Markov chain is called time-homogeneous.
Denote pij = Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) as the single-step time-independent tran-
sition probability. For a time-homogeneous Markov chain, it can be described by a
transition matrix [pij] (i.e., [pij] is the (i, j)th element), and the stationary distribu-








Πj = 1, (2.4)




Approach for Dynamic Spectrum
Allocation
Dynamic spectrum access has become a promising approach to fully utilize
the scarce spectrum resources. It enhances service quality by utilizing others’ spec-
trum resources. Dynamic spectrum access has shown its great potential in efficient
spectrum utilization by opening white space in under-used licensed spectrum to
unlicensed users (a.k.a. secondary users), meaning secondary users can opportunis-
tically utilize the licensed spectrum when primary users are not operating in the
licensed spectrum.
Several prior works as discussed in Chapter 2 have proposed efficient spectrum
management approaches, but most of them only focus on spectrum allocation among
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secondary users in a static spectrum environment. Therefore, several fundamental
challenges still remain unanswered. First, the radio spectrum environment is con-
stantly changing. In conventional power control to manage mutual interference for
a fixed number of secondary users, after each change of the number of contending
secondary users, the network needs to re-optimize the power allocation for all users
completely. This results in high complexity and much overhead. Second, if a pri-
mary user appears in some specific portion of the spectrum, secondary users in that
band need to adapt their transmission parameters to avoid interfering with the pri-
mary user. Furthermore, in addition to maximizing the overall spectrum utilization,
a good spectrum sharing scheme should also achieve fairness among dissimilar users.
If multiple secondary users are allowed to access the licensed spectrum, dynamically
coordinating their access to alleviate mutual interference and avoid conflict with
primary users should be carefully considered.
In this chapter we propose a primary-prioritized Markov approach for dynamic
spectrum access. Specifically, we propose to model the interactions between the
primary users and the secondary users as continuous-time Markov chains (CTMC),
by which we can capture the system evolution dynamics, especially the effect of the
primary user’s activities on the secondary users. It has been shown in [Cla07a],
[Cla07b] that when unlicensed devices coexist with licensed devices in the same
frequency and time simultaneously, the capacity achieved by unlicensed devices with
reduced power is very low, while they still cause harmful interference to the licensed
users. Therefore, in this chapter, we assume that when primary users exist in some
spectrum band, secondary users cannot operate in the same band simultaneously.
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Further, in order to coordinate secondary spectrum access in a fair and efficient
manner, dynamic spectrum access under different criteria is proposed based on the
CTMC models. In the proposed approach, the spectrum access of different users is
optimally coordinated through the modeling of secondary spectrum access statistics
to alleviate mutual interference.
The contributions of the proposed primary-prioritized Markov approach for
dynamic spectrum access are as follows. First, the dynamics of the radio system,
including the primary user’s activities, is thoroughly captured through CTMC mod-
eling. Second, we consider various policies of spectrum access by employing different
optimality criteria, among which we focus on the proportional-fair (PF) spectrum
access approach to achieve the optimal tradeoff between spectrum utilization effi-
ciency and fairness. Third, the proposed PF spectrum access approach can achieve
better performance than the CSMA-based scheme, and can be generalized to spec-
trum sharing among multiple secondary users.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Dynamic spectrum
access system model is described in Section 3.1. The primary-prioritized Markov
models are derived in Section 3.2, and dynamic spectrum access approaches based
on these models are developed in Section 3.3. The simulation studies are provided
in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 provides the summary.
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3.1 System Model
We consider dynamic spectrum access networks where multiple secondary users
are allowed to access the temporarily-unused licensed spectrum bands on an oppor-
tunistic basis, without conflicting or interfering the primary spectrum holders’ usage.
Such scenarios can be envisioned in many applications. Considering the fact [FCC02]
that heavy spectrum utilization often takes place in unlicensed bands while licensed
bands often experience low (e.g., TV bands) or medium (e.g., some cellular bands)
utilization, IEEE 802.22 [IEE] proposes to reuse the fallow TV spectrum without
causing any harmful interference to incumbents (e.g., the TV receivers). Moreover,
with regard to more efficient utilization of some cellular bands, [Ofc] proposes to
share the spectrum between a cellular communication system and wireless local area
network (WLAN) systems. In rural areas where there is little demand on the cellu-
lar communication system, the WLAN users can efficiently increase their data rates
by sharing the spectrum.
In order to take advantage of the temporally unused spectrum holes in the li-
censed band, without loss of generality we consider a snapshot of the above spectrum
access networks shown in Figure 3.1, where two secondary users and one primary
user coexist, and the secondary users opportunistically utilize the spectrum holes
in the licensed band. Note that the system diagram shown here serves only as an
example model to gain more insight and the scenario with multiple secondary users
will be studied in details in the following section.
The primary user is denoted by P , which has a license to operate in the
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Figure 3.1: System model (upper: system diagram; lower: throughput vs. time).
spectrum band. The offered traffic for primary user P is modeled with two random
processes1. The service request is modeled as a Poisson process with rate λP s
−1.
The service duration (holding time) is negative-exponentially distributed with mean
time 1/µP s, so the departure of user P ’s traffic is another Poisson process with rate
µP s
−1.
The secondary users are denoted by A and B, and set S is defined as S =
{A,B}. For each secondary user γ, where γ ∈ S, its service session is similarly
characterized by two independent Poisson processes, with arrival rate λγ s
−1 and
departure rate µγ s
−1. They contend to access the spectrum when primary user P
is not using the spectrum band.
Since the primary user has a license to operate in the spectrum band, its access
1Identical assumptions that the service requests and departures are Poisson processes can be
found in [XCMS06], [HHLW00] and references therein.
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should not be affected by the operation of any other secondary user, and priority
to access the spectrum is given to primary user P . We assume that the secondary
users equipped with cognitive radios are capable of detecting the primary user’s
activities, i.e., the appearance of the primary user in the spectrum band and its
departure from the spectrum. Furthermore, the secondary users’ access is assumed
to be controlled by a secondary management point so that they can distinguish
whether the spectrum is occupied by the primary user or secondary users. Therefore,
when primary user P appears, the secondary users should adjust their transmission
parameters, for instance reduce the transmit power or vacate the channels and
try to transfer their communications to other available bands. The interference
temperature model [FCC03a] is proposed by FCC that allows secondary users to
transmit in licensed bands with carefully adjusted power, provided that secondary
users’ transmission does not raise the interference temperature for that frequency
band over the interference temperature limit. Although it can provide better service
continuity for the secondary users to remain operating in the band with reduced
power, the capacity they can achieve is very low [Cla07a], [Cla07b]. Therefore, in
this chapter, we assume that when primary user P appears, any secondary user
should vacate and the traffic currently being served is cut off. In the duration
of primary user P being served, any entry of the secondary user’s traffic into the
spectrum is denied until primary user P finishes its service.
In the bottom of Figure 3.1, we show an example of the system throughput
versus time for the dynamic spectrum access. First, user A accesses the spectrum
band, followed by user B. During B’s service, user A accesses the band again and
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shares the spectrum band with user B, which may result in less throughput to both
user A and B due to their mutual interference. After user A has finished its service
for a while, primary user P accesses the band, and user B’s service is interrupted.
After user P vacates the band, user B continues its service until its service duration
ends. Afterwards, user A accesses the band, and its service is ceased when primary
user P appears and resumed when P finishes its service in the way as user B.
For any secondary user γ that operates in the spectrum band alone, its maxi-
mal data rate [CT90] can be represented by




where W is the communication bandwidth, n0 is power of the additive white Gaus-
sian noise (AWGN), pγ is the transmission power for user γ, and Gγγ is the channel
gain for user γ. The secondary users A and B are allowed to share the spectrum
band. We assume that the transmitter of a secondary user can vary its data rate
through a combination of adaptive modulation and coding, so the transmitter and
receiver can employ the highest rate that permits reliable communication, given the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). We assume that the secondary users
use random Gaussian codebooks, so their transmitted signals can be treated as
white Gaussian processes and the transmission of other secondary users are treated
as Gaussian noise. Then, the maximal rate of user γ when secondary users share
the spectrum can be represented by






where α 6= γ, α ∈ S, and Gαγ is the channel gain from user α’s transmitter to user
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γ’s receiver.
3.2 Primary-Prioritized Markov Models
In this section, we derive primary-prioritized Markov models to capture the
dynamics of spectrum access statistics for the primary user and the secondary users.
3.2.1 CTMC without Queuing
In dynamic spectrum access, where the secondary users opportunistically ac-
cess the unused licensed spectrum, priority should be given to the primary user.
That is, secondary users cannot operate in the same spectrum band with the pri-
mary user at the same time; when the primary user appears in the spectrum band, all
secondary users in the same band should stop operating in the spectrum. Moreover,
the arrival and departure of different users’ traffic are assumed to be independent
Poisson processes. Therefore, we model the interactions between the secondary users
and the primary user as a primary-prioritized CTMC.
In the CTMC, when the secondary users contend to access the idle spectrum
using CSMA, collisions only occur when their service requests arrive exactly at the
same time. This case rarely happens for independent Poisson processes. Therefore,
in the CTMC model we omit the collision state of the secondary users, and assume
their service durations always start from different time instances.
If we assume that when the primary user appears, there is no queuing of
the interrupted service for the secondary users, then we can model the spectrum
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Figure 3.2: The rate diagram of CTMC with no queuing.
access process as a five-state CTMC shown in Figure 3.2. We denote this five-state
Markov chain by “CTMC-5” for short, where state 0 means no user operates in the
spectrum, state γ means user γ operates in the spectrum with γ ∈ {A,B, P}, and
state 2 means both user A and user B operate in the spectrum.
Assume at first the spectrum band is idle, i.e., CTMC-5 is in state 0. Secondary
users contend to operate in the spectrum. Upon the first access attempt of some user,
say user A, CTMC-5 enters state A with transition rate λA s
−1. If user A’s service
completes before any other user requests spectrum access, CTMC-5 then transits to
state 0 with rate µA s
−1. If user B’s service request arrives before A completes its
service, CTMC-5 transits to state 2 with rate λB s
−1, where both secondary users
share the spectrum. Once user B (or A)’s service is completed, CTMC-5 transits
from state 2 to state A (or B), with rate µB (or µA) s
−1. However, primary user
P may, once in a while, appear during the service duration of the secondary users,
i.e., when CTMC-5 is in state A, B or 2. At that time, the secondary user’s traffic
is dropped to avoid conflict with the primary user, and CTMC-5 transits to state
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P with rate λP s
−1. During the primary user operating in the spectrum band, no
secondary user is given access to the spectrum. CTMC-5 transits to state 0 with
rate µP s
−1 only if P completes its service.
The “flow-balance” (the rate at which transitions take place out of state si
equals to the rate at which transitions take place into state si) and the normalization
[Kul95] equations governing the above system are given by
µAΠA + µP ΠP + µBΠB = (λA + λB + λP )Π0, (3.3)
λAΠ0 + µBΠ2 = (µA + λP + λB)ΠA, (3.4)
λP (Π0 + ΠA + Π2 + ΠB) = µP ΠP , (3.5)
λBΠ0 + µAΠ2 = (µB + λP + λA)ΠB, (3.6)
λBΠA + λAΠB = (µB + λP + µA)Π2, (3.7)
Π0 + ΠA + ΠB + ΠP + Π2 = 1, (3.8)
where Πsi represents the stationary probability of being in state si, si ∈ S
4
=
{0, A, B, P, 2}.
The solutions to the above equations, i.e., the probabilities when the spectrum
is occupied by either primary user P or the secondary users, are given by
ΠP = λP /(λP + µP ), (3.9)
ΠA = C1λA[λBµB + (λP + µB)(λA + λP + µA + µB)], (3.10)
ΠB = C1λB[λAµA + (λP + µA)(λB + λP + µA + µB)], (3.11)
Π2 = C1λAλB(λA + λB + 2λP + µA + µB), (3.12)
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where, for simplicity, the coefficient C1 is defined as
C1 =(1− ΠP )[(λA + µA + λP )(λB + µB + λP )
(λA + µA + λB + µB + λP )]
−1.
(3.13)
One of the most important goals in spectrum sharing is efficient spectrum
utilization, i.e., high throughput achieved by each secondary user through successful
acquisition of a spectrum band. From a statistical point of view, the secondary users
want to maximize their average throughput. Given the solutions of the steady state
probabilities, we know that Πsi is the stationary probability that the system is in
state si, so it can be thought of as the expected long-run fraction of the time that







Pr{S(t) = si}dt, (3.14)











as the long-run expected average throughput for user γ, where Rγ(S(t)) is the

































The interchanges of limits, integrals, sums, etc. are permitted as long as
∑
si∈S |Rγ(si)|
Πsi < ∞. Thus, from CTMC-5, we can express the total average throughput for










2 are defined in (3.1)
and (3.2), respectively. The first term on the right-hand side of (3.17) represents
the throughput when user γ occupies the spectrum alone, and the second term
represents the throughput when two secondary users share the spectrum.
Therefore, by using CTMC-5, we not only can capture the dynamic utiliza-
tion of the unused licensed spectrum for secondary users without conflicting with
the primary user, but also can study their stationary behaviors and quantify their
spectrum utilization from a statistical point of view.
The CTMC can also be generalized to model the scenario with more than
two secondary users. Suppose the set of N secondary users is denoted by S =
{1, · · · , N}, then the state space A consists of 2N + 1 combinations of the status of
primary user P and the secondary users:
(ΦP ,ΦS) ∈ A 4= {(1, [0, · · · , 0])}
⋃
{(0, φS) : φS 4= [nN , · · · , n1] ∈ {0, 1}N},
(3.18)
where state (1, [0, · · · , 0]) represents the case where the primary user is in service in
the spectrum band alone, and {(0, φS)} represents all 2N states where primary user
P is not in service and zero up to N secondary users are in service.
For this generalized Markov model, the rate diagram can be drawn as an N -
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dimensional hypercube. Each vertex of the hypercube represents a state in {(0, φS)};
each edge connecting two vertices is bi-directional, and it represents the transition
that some secondary user begins or completes its service. The center of the hyper-
cube represents state (1, [0, · · · , 0]); a straight line from each vertex to the center
represents the transition when primary user P begins its service, and another line
from the center to state (0, [0, · · · , 0]) represents the transition when user P com-
pletes its service.
The stationary probabilities can be obtained as follows.




j−1nj, S2N denote state (1, [0, · · · , 0]), and qij 4= q{Si → Sj}
denote the transition rate from state Si to Sj;
• Construct the generator matrix Q = [qij]:
1. for Si = (0, [nN , · · · , nj, · · · , n1]), where i = 0, · · · , 2N − 1, and j =
1, · · · , N ,
q{(0, [nN , · · · , nj, · · · , n1]) → (0, [nN , · · · , 1 − nj, · · · , n1])} = µj(nj =
1), or λj(nj = 0); q{Si → S2N} = λP ; qii = −
∑
j 6=i qij;
2. q{S2N → S0} = µP , q{S2N → S2N} = −µP ;
• Solve the stationary probability Π = [ΠS0 , · · · , ΠS2N−1 , ΠS2N ] from
QaugΠ















Figure 3.3: The rate diagram of CTMC with queuing.
For each secondary user γ, γ ∈ S = {1, · · · , N}, its average throughput con-
sists of 2N−1 components, each of which represents the average throughput when
user γ, together with zero up to all the other N − 1 secondary users, are in ser-
vice. Since more secondary users contend the spectrum access, the contention in
the generalized Markov model becomes heavier than CTMC-5. As a result, each
secondary user shares less spectrum access on average. Moreover, the interference
also increases by introducing more secondary users. Therefore, as the number of
secondary users increases, the average throughput for each of them is reduced.
3.2.2 CTMC with Queuing
In CTMC-5 presented in Section 3.2.1, the service of the secondary users is
forced to stop and be dropped when primary user P appears in the spectrum band.
After primary user P completes its service, CTMC-5 will transit to the idle state.
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However, there may be some time interval wasted between when the system is
in the idle state and the next secondary user accesses the spectrum. In order to
further increase the spectrum utilization, queuing of the secondary users’ service
requests due to the primary user’s presence is considered. More specifically, when
the spectrum is being occupied by secondary users, upon the appearance of primary
user, the secondary users should stop transmission, buffer their interrupted service
session, and continue scanning the licensed band until the licensed band becomes
available again. Also, if the primary user begins to operate in the previously idle
spectrum, new service requests of secondary users are also queued. In this chapter,
we assume that there is one waiting room for the secondary user, i.e., each user
can only buffer a single service request; and if a service request already exists in the
queue, the secondary user will direct the following service requests to other available
licensed bands to avoid potential delay, and that scenario is beyond the scope of this
chapter.
By considering the above factors, we model the spectrum access with queuing
as an eight-state CTMC, denoted by “CTMC-8”. The rate diagram of CTMC-
8 is shown in Figure 3.3. Compared to CTMC-5 and its dynamics, in CTMC-8
three additional states are introduced: (P,Aw), (P,Bw) and (P, (AB)w). State
(P, γw) means primary user P is in service and secondary user γ is waiting, and
state (P, (AB)w) means P is in service and both secondary users are waiting. The
transitions in CTMC-8 are briefed as follows. When the spectrum band is occupied
by secondary user A, if A detects that primary user P needs to acquire the spectrum
band, it buffers the unfinished service session, sensing the licensed band until the
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end of the primary user’s service session, and CTMC-8 transits from state (0, A)
to state (P, Aw) with rate λP s
−1. If primary user P finishes its service before B’s
access, CTMC-8 transits from state (P, Aw) to (0, A) with rate µP s
−1. In contrast,
if secondary user B requests access to the licensed spectrum before primary user
P completes its service duration, B also buffers its service session, and CTMC-8
transits to state (P, (AB)w) with rate λB s
−1. In state (P, (AB)w), both A and
B keep sensing the spectrum. Once P vacates, CTMC-8 transits to state (0, AB)
with rate µP s
−1, where A and B share the spectrum band. Also, when CTMC-8
is in state (P, 0), if secondary users attempt to access the spectrum, they will keep
sensing the licensed band until the primary user vacates, and CTMC-8 transits to
state (P, Aw) or state (P,Bw), with rate λA s
−1 or λB s−1, respectively.
The equations governing the above system and the corresponding solutions
can be obtained in a similar way as in Section 3.2.1.
CTMC with queuing can also be generalized to model the scenario with more
than two secondary users. For the Markov chain with a set S = {1, · · · , N} of
secondary users, the state space B consists of all possible 2N+1 combinations of the
status for primary user P and the secondary users:
(ΨP ,ΨS) ∈ B 4= {(1, ψwS )
⋃
(0, ψS) : ψS
4
= [nN , · · · , n1] ∈ {0, 1}N},
(3.20)
where {(1, ψwS )} represents all 2N states in which the primary user is in service and
zero up to N secondary users are waiting, and {(0, ψS)} represents all 2N states
where primary user P is not in service and a subset of the N secondary users are in
service. The rate diagram for this model can be similarly drawn as in Section 3.2.1,
35
and the stationary probabilities can be obtained as follows.
• Notation: Let Si denote state (0, [nN , · · · , n1]), and Swi denote state (1, [nN ,
· · · , n1]w).
• Construct the generator matrix Q = [qij]:
1. for Si = (0, [nN , · · · , nj, · · · , n1]), where i = 0, · · · , 2N − 1, and j =
1, · · · , N ,
q{(0, [nN , · · · , nj, · · · , n1]) → (0, [nN , · · · , 1 − nj, · · · , n1])} = µj(nj =
1), or λj(nj = 0);
q{(1, [nN , · · · , nj, · · · , n1]w) → (1, [nN , · · · , 1− nj, · · · , n1]w)} = λj(nj =
0);
2. q{Si → Swi } = λP ; q{Swi → Si} = µP ; qii = −
∑
j 6=i qij;
• Solve the equation array similar to (3.19).
As more secondary users contend the spectrum, in addition to increased inter-
ference, more waiting time is also introduced; therefore, the average throughput for
each secondary user will be reduced.
3.3 Proposed Dynamic Spectrum Access
In this section, we will first analyze the effect of secondary users’ behavior on
the system performance. Then, we propose primary-prioritized dynamic spectrum
access with different optimality criteria and compare them to CSMA-based random
access approaches.
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In order to develop primary-prioritized dynamic spectrum access, it is impor-
tant to first analyze the behavior of the secondary users. Since the secondary users
contend for the spectrum, if they access the spectrum in a greedy manner such that
all of their injected traffic is admitted, then the Markov chain is more likely to be
in the state where more than one user shares the spectrum. Hence, the secondary
users may suffer a throughput degradation due to interference, if there is no control
on very high arrival rates. On the other hand, if the secondary users reduce their
arrival rates too much so as to avoid interference, the average throughput may be
unnecessarily low. Therefore, secondary user spectrum access should be carefully
controlled.
In the proposed dynamic spectrum access scheme, we introduce the state-
dependent spectrum access probabilities for user A and user B, and the result-
ing random access process can be approximated by slightly modifying the original
CTMCs. Without loss of generality, we take CTMC-5 as an example, and the mod-
ified Markov chain is shown in Figure 3.4. It is seen from the figure that when
one secondary user, e.g. user B, already occupies the spectrum and the system is
in state B, user A’s spectrum access requests are admitted with probability aA,1,
where 0 ≤ aA,1 ≤ 1. Since on average one out of 1aA,1 user A’s access requests
are allowed when user B is in service, the chance of coexistence of the secondary
users and mutual interference can be reduced. Due to the decomposition property of
Poisson random process [Kul95], if each access request of user A has a probability
aA,1 of being admitted, then the number of actual admitted access requests is also
a Poisson process with parameter aA,1λA s
−1. Hence, the transition rate from state
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Figure 3.4: Modified CTMC with access control (no queuing).
B to state 2 now becomes aA,1λA s
−1. It is also seen that user A’s access requests
are admitted with probability aA,2 when the spectrum is idle (i.e., the transition
from state 0 to state A). However, there is no interference in state A. In order to
obtain a high throughput, we assume that when the spectrum is sensed idle, user A
is allowed to access the spectrum with probability one, i.e., aA,2 = 1. In addition,
it is expected that if the mutual interference between the secondary users is high,
aA,1 should be close to 0; if there is little mutual interference, aA,1 should be close
to 1. User B’s spectrum access is controlled in a similar way as user A, because the
CTMC is symmetric.
Denote the access probability for user A and user B as vectors aA = [aA,1, aA,2],
and aB = [aB,1, aB,2], respectively. Then, the optimization goal is to determine aA





where ∀γ ∈ {A,B}.
Since a good spectrum sharing scheme not only can efficiently utilize the spec-
trum resources, but also can provide fairness among different users, we first propose
to maximize the average throughput based on PF criterion [Kel97] [HJL05]. Thus,
in (3.21), U(aA, aB) can be written as










and max-min fairness criterion
U(aA, aB) = min
γ∈S
Uγ(aA, aB). (3.24)
For the maximal-throughput optimization, the overall system throughput is
maximized, but the users with the worse channel conditions may starve. For the
max-min fairness optimization, the performance of the secondary user with the
worst channel condition is optimized, while resulting in inferior overall system per-
formance. In this chapter, we will demonstrate that the PF dynamic spectrum access
is preferred because it can ensure more fairness than the maximal-throughput opti-
mization, while achieve better performance than the max-min fairness optimization.
Specifically, the definition of PF is expressed as follows.
Definition: The throughput distribution is proportionally fair if any change in
the distribution of throughput pairs results in the sum of the proportional changes
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of the throughput being non-positive [Kel97], i.e.,
∑
γ∈S
Uγ(aA, aB)− U∗γ (aA, aB)
U∗γ (aA, aB)
≤ 0, (3.25)
where U∗γ (aA, aB) is the proportionally fair throughput distribution, and Uγ(aA, aB)
is any other feasible throughput distribution for user γ.
The optimal solution U∗γ (aA, aB) defined in (3.25) can be obtained by solving
(3.21), with U(aA, aB) defined in (3.22). We sketch the proof as follows.




ln Uγ(aA, aB). (3.26)










As the PF utility U∗γ optimizes (3.26), for a small feasible perturbation from
the PF utility, we can omit the high-order polynomials in the Taylor series, apply













Since the feasible region for Uγ is a convex set and the logarithm function (3.26) is
strictly concave, (3.27) holds for any point deviating from the PF utility. Therefore,
the definition of the PF criterion in (3.22) and (3.25) is equivalent.
As mentioned earlier in this section, we assume aA,2 = aB,2 = 1, then the two
access probabilities to be optimized are aA,1 and aB,1. We denote them by aA and
aB for simplicity, and can write Uγ as
Uγ(aA, aB) = Πγ(aA, aB)r
γ






ΠA(aA, aB) = C1λA[(λP + µB)(aAλA + λP + µA + µB) + aAλBµB]
ΠB(aA, aB) = C1λB[(λP + µA)(aBλB + λP + µA + µB) + aBλAµA]
Π2(aA, aB) = C1λAλB[aA(aB(λA + λB) + λP + µA) + aB(λP + µB)]
, (3.29)
with
C1 =(1− ΠP )
{
aAλA[aBλB(λA + λB + λP ) + (λB + λP )(λP + µA)
+ (λB + λP + µA)µB + λA(λP + µB)]
+ (λP + µA + µB)[λA(λP + µB) + (λP + µA)(λB + λP + µB)]




When 0 ≤ aγ ≤ 1, we have ΠA(aA, aB) ≥ 0, ΠB(aA, aB) ≥ 0, Π2(aA, aB) ≥ 0,








So when secondary user A is given more chance to access the frequency band,
i.e., when aA increases, UA(aA, aB) becomes larger while UB(aA, aB) shrinks, in-
dicating that there is a possible tradeoff to choose the optimal aA that maximizes
UPF (aA, aB) = UA(aA, aB)UB(aA, aB). However, it can be seen that there are a lot of
variables in Uγ(aA, aB) and hence the objective function UPF (aA, aB). In addition,
the utility of each secondary user Uγ is a complicated function of the {λγ, µγ, aγ}’s
and the data rates {rγ1 , rγ2}’s. Therefore, it is analytically difficult to justify the
concavity for arbitrary parameters. Nevertheless, given a specific set of parameters
{λγ, µγ}’s and {rγ1 , rγ2}’s, we can substitute their values in (3.29) and determine
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Table 3.1: Primary-prioritized dynamic spectrum access
1. Initially primary user P is operating in the spectrum band;
2. Secondary access point obtains optimal access probabilities defined in
(3.32) for secondary users (Other optimality criteria can also be
implemented);
3. Once primary user P is sensed to have completed its service, secondary
users start to access the spectrum band with the probabilities solved
in Step 2 depending on various states;
4. When primary user P re-appears in the band, secondary users currently
operating in the band vacate;
5. If secondary users still have service not completed, go back to Step 3;
If the statistics of secondary users’ services or their locations change,
go to Step 2.
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the concavity of UPF (aA, aB) by observing the Hessian matrix ∇2UPF (aA, aB), for
0 ≤ aA, aB ≤ 1. When the two eigenvalues of ∇2UPF (aA, aB) are not greater
than zero, i.e., the Hessian matrix is negative semidefinite, we can determine that
UPF (aA, aB) is concave with respect to aA and aB, and the optimal access probabil-
ities can be expressed as
aoptγ,i = min{max(a∗γ,i, 0), 1}, (3.32)
where a∗γ,i is the solution to the following equations
∂UPF (aA, aB)
∂aγ,i
= 0, ∀γ, i ∈ S. (3.33)
However, for some value of λγ, µγ, if r
γ
1 À rγ2 , indicating heavy mutual interference,
function UPF (aA, aB) may not be concave, and the optimal solution of aγ is 0 to
avoid interference. Another instance where UPF (aA, aB) is not concave happens
when λγ ¿ µγ, and the optimal solution is aγ = 1.
We assume that there exists a secondary base station (BS) that can control
the medium access for all the secondary users. The secondary users send periodic
reports to the BS informing it about their service statistics and date rates. Using
the information gathered from all secondary users, the BS evaluates the spectrum
utilization, computes the optimal access probability in different states (i.e., when
different set of secondary users are in service), and sends the access probability to
the secondary users. Based on the above discussions, we illustrate our primary-
prioritized Markov approach for dynamic spectrum access in Table 3.1.
The proposed primary-prioritized dynamic spectrum access shares some char-
acteristic with conventional medium access control (MAC) protocols, since they
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all target appropriate coordination of different users’ access to the medium. For
instance, in IEEE 802.11 [IEE99], a CSMA/CA mechanism is employed. If the
medium is sensed idle, a user transmits its packet; if the medium is sensed busy,
then the user may re-schedule the retransmission of the packet according to some
random back-off time distribution. These kinds of protocols are effective when the
medium is not heavily loaded, since they allow users to transmit with minimum de-
lay. However, under heavy traffic load, there is always a chance that users’ attempts
conflict with each other. If the conflicted users are kept waiting for an idle medium,
their packets suffer significant delay and may expire.
In the proposed primary-prioritized dynamic spectrum access, different sec-
ondary users are allowed to share the spectrum band simultaneously. This will
increase the spectrum utilization because of the following reasons. First, for in-
dependent Poisson processes, the service durations of different secondary users are
generally not the same. For instance, in CTMC-5, even though user B begins oper-
ating in the spectrum band right after user A, it is possible that user A completes its
service much earlier than user B. After user B is admitted to occupy the spectrum
band, the two secondary users share the spectrum only for a very short time. Once
A finishes its service, the Markov chain transits to the state where B operates in
the spectrum alone and no interference exists. Using CSMA protocols, however,
user B is forced to re-transmit its packet after a random back-off time, which may
not be short. Therefore, using the proposed approaches, the spectrum can be more
efficiently utilized. Furthermore, in the proposed schemes, optimal access probabili-
ties are employed to carefully control the coexistence of the secondary users. In this
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way, the interference is maintained at a low level.
Also, in a mobile network, the radio spectrum environment is dynamic. When
using global optimization approaches specific to a fixed environment, for instance
conventional power control to manage mutual interference between a fixed number
of secondary users, after each change in the number of contending secondary users,
the network needs to re-optimize the power allocation for all users completely. This
results in high complexity and much overhead, especially when there are frequent
service requests and the service duration is short. In the proposed approach, by
controlling the access probabilities for secondary users, there is no need to perform
delicate power control to manage the interference, and computational complexity is
reduced while the average throughput is maximized in the long-run.
In order to achieve optimal dynamic spectrum access, a certain overhead
is needed. More specifically, the overhead mainly comes from access controlling
and sensing primary users. To optimally coordinate the access of the secondary
users, necessary measurements needs to be taken, such as the throughput and ar-
rival/departure rates for different secondary users. On the other hand, detecting a
primary user’s presence relies mainly on the observations from the secondary users
and the necessary spectral analysis.
3.4 Simulation Studies
In this section, we first compare the performance of CTMC-8 with different
optimization goals (maximal-throughput, max-min, and PF). Then we compare the
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performance of CTMC-8, CTMC-5, and the nonpersistent CSMA-based random
access. Finally we show the throughput gain of spectrum sharing among more than
two secondary users against the case without access control.
The parameters in the simulations are chosen as follows. We set the bandwidth
of the licensed spectrum as W = 200 KHz, the transmission power of each secondary
user pγ = 2 mW, the noise power n0 = 10
−15 W, and the propagation loss exponent
factor as 3.6. The departure rates µA, µB, µP are set to be 100 s
−1. According
to [M. 05], in the spectrum band allocated to cellular phone and Specialized Mobile
Radio (SMR), the fraction of time that the spectrum is being used by primary users
in an urban environment is measured as approximately 45%. Thus, when µP is
100 s−1, we set the arrival rate of the primary user λP = 85 s−1. The arrival rate
of secondary user B is λB = 85 s
−1, and we vary λA from 70 to 100 s−1. In the
simulation results, we use “Max-Thr” to denote the maximal-throughput criterion,
“Max-Min” to denote the max-min fairness criterion, and “A” and “B” to denote
secondary users A and B, respectively.
3.4.1 CTMC-8 for the Symmetric-Interference Case
In the first set of simulations, we test the case where two secondary users
experience symmetric interference. The transmitter of user A is at (0m, 0m), and
its receiver is at (200m, 0m). The transmitter of user B is at (200m, 460m), and







2 from (3.1) and (3.2). In Figure 3.5, we show the optimal
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Figure 3.5: Access probability vs. λA (symmetric-interference, λB = 85 s
−1).
access probability versus λA for each secondary user when the other secondary user
is transmitting, i.e., the access probability associated with the transition from state
(0, γ) to (0, AB) in CTMC-8 (see Figure 3.3).
Since CTMC-8 is symmetric for the two users, when λA < λB = 85 s
−1, user A
will have a smaller time share than user B if there is no access probability control.






2 , from the definition of the average
throughput in (3.17), user A will experience a lower average throughput than B. In
order to provide more fairness, PF and max-min optimization assigns user B a zero
access probability and assigns user A a higher access probability than user B when
λA < λB = 85 s
−1. With the increase of λA, the difference between the two users’
time share becomes smaller, so the access probability of user A decreases and is
equal to B’s access probability when λA = λB. When λA > λB, user B is assigned a
higher access probability due to a smaller time share, while user A’s access requests
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Figure 3.6: Average throughput vs. λA (symmetric-interference, λB = 85 s
−1).
are denied. However, when λA > λB = 85 s
−1, λA is much higher and the probability
of State A is also higher, in order to reduce the mutual interference, the growth of
B’s access probability is not symmetric to the decrease of A’s. Due to the mutual
interference, the maximal-throughput optimization assigns zero access probability
to both users when the other user is in service.
In Figure 3.6, we show the throughput Uγ for each user. Max-min fairness
optimization provides absolute fairness to both users: the two Uγ’s are identical
and increase as λA goes up. In the PF optimization, when λA < λB, we have
UA < UB. As λA becomes higher, UA increases; however, as shown in Figure 3.5,
user A’s access probability decreases as λA increases until λA = λB = 85 s
−1, so the
mutual interference is managed and UB also increases. When λA = λB = 85 s
−1,
UA = UB, since the secondary users are identical in terms of both channel conditions
and service requests. As λA further increases, UA > UB and UA keeps increasing;
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Figure 3.7: Access probability for different λP (λB = 85 s
−1).
since user B’s access probability increases as λA > λB = 85 s
−1 (see Figure 3.5), UB
also increases. For the maximal-throughput optimization, as seen from Figure 3.5,
the access probabilities of the two users are both zero, indicating that they are not
allowed to transmit simultaneously, so UA keeps increasing as λA increases, while
UB drops quickly, which is unfair.
In Figure 3.7, we show the effect of λP on the average access probability.
In this set of simulations, λB is still set as 85 s
−1 and we vary λA from 70 to
100 s−1. We know from Figure 3.5 that the user with the higher access rate has
a zero access probability when the other user is in service. Therefore, we only
demonstrate the nonzero access probability of the user with a lower access rate,
i.e., we show user A’s access probability when λA < λB = 85 s
−1 and user B’s
access probability when λA > λB = 85 s
−1. In Figure 3.7, we compare the average
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Figure 3.8: Access probability vs. λA (asymmetric-interference, λB = 85 s
−1).
access probability when λP is chosen from {90, 80, 70} s−1. We know that as λP
increases, the competition between the secondary users becomes more severe. In
order to reduce mutual interference, when λA is a fixed value, both users’ access
probabilities decrease as λP becomes larger.
3.4.2 CTMC-8 for the Asymmetric-Interference Case
In the second set of simulations, the transmitter of user A is at (0m, 0m), and
its receiver is at (200m, 0m). The transmitter of user B is at (185m, 460m), and







from (3.1) and (3.2), so the interference is asymmetric. In Figure 3.8, we show
the optimal access probabilities versus λA for each secondary user when the other
is transmitting. Since user A has a worse channel condition than user B, for the
maximal-throughput optimization, user A’s access probability is 0 (e.g., user A’s
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Figure 3.9: Average throughput vs. λA (asymmetric-interference, λB = 85 s
−1).
requests are always rejected) when user B is in service, which is unfair. For the
PF or max-min fairness optimization, when λA < λB = 85 s
−1, user A’s access
probability is 1 (e.g., user A’s requests are always admitted), while only a part of
B’s requests are admitted, due to fairness concerns. When λA is a little greater
than λB, unlike the symmetric-interference case, user A’s probability is still 1 and
higher than B’s access probability, because user A has a worse channel condition
than B. When λA exceeds 90 s
−1, the chance of co-existence is so high that the
access probabilities for both users drop to avoid interference.
In Figure 3.9, we show the average throughput for each secondary user. We
know from Figure 3.8 that in the maximal-throughput optimization, user A’s access
probability is 0 and user B’s access probability is 1; therefore, UB is much greater
than UA. The PF optimization greatly reduces the throughput difference between
the two users, with only a small loss of total throughput.
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Figure 3.10: Overall throughput for CTMC-5, CTMC-8 and CSMA.
3.4.3 Comparison with a CSMA-based Scheme
In Figure 3.10, we show the overall throughput of the PF dynamic spec-
trum access for CTMC-8, CTMC-5, and the overall throughput for a CSMA-based
scheme [KT75]. The transmitters for both secondary users are uniformly located in
a 200m × 200m square area, the distance between each transmitter-receiver pair is
uniformly distributed in [100m, 200m], and the other parameters are the same as in
the previous setting. We choose the slotted version of the nonpersistent CSMA to
avoid frequent collisions assuming the secondary users experience severe contention
for the licensed spectrum, and the slot size is 0.005. So when primary user P is
absent and one secondary user γ is transmitting, the later-coming secondary user
senses the spectrum in every 0.005/µγ s until the licensed spectrum is available
again.
We can see that the PF access for both CTMCs have better performance than
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CSMA-based scheme as λA increases. This is because in CSMA, the secondary users
cannot utilize the spectrum at the same time. Thus, even though interference exists
when secondary users share the spectrum, by allowing spectrum sharing between
them and optimally controlling their access probabilities, performance gain can still
be achieved.
As λA increases, the overall throughput of the PF access for both CTMCs
increases, while the throughput of CSMA-based scheme decreases. When λA = 100
s−1, CTMC-5 can achieve about 50% throughput gain over CSMA, and CTMC-8
can achieve more than 95% throughput gain. This shows that the proposed PF
access approach has a larger capability than CSMA to accommodate more traffic.
Moreover, the spectrum efficiency of CTMC-8 is higher than that of CTMC-5, due
to queuing of the interrupted service.
3.4.4 Comparison with a Uniform-Access-Probability Scheme
In [WJL07], we have proposed a uniform access probability for each secondary
user no matter what state the CTMC is in. However, when the licensed spectrum
is idle, the access probability may restrain full spectrum utilization. Moreover, the
interference condition for one secondary user is varying when different subsets of
secondary users share the spectrum. Only optimizing one single access probability
may result in a sub-optimal solution. In this subsection, we conduct simulations
to compare the scheme proposed in this chapter with the one in [WJL07]. In the
comparison, we adopt the PF method, while the transmission power, request/service
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Figure 3.11: The histogram of throughput improvement (UPF )
rates, and the locations of the secondary users are all uniformly distributed in a
proper interval, and we test 1000 independent experiments to get the average. The
histogram of the performance gain (UPF ) is shown in Figure 3.11. We see that the
proposed scheme in this chapter with state-dependent access probability achieves
on average a 24% higher system throughput than the scheme using a uniform access
probability in [WJL07].
3.4.5 Spectrum Sharing Among Multiple Secondary Users
Spectrum access with multiple secondary users can also be optimally controlled
using a method where the access probabilities are obtained with numerical search
algorithms. The transmitter-receiver pair of each user is randomly distributed in a
200m× 200m square area, and the transmission power is randomly chosen between
1mW and 3mW. In Figure 3.12, we compare the total throughput of the proposed
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Total throughput vs. # of secondary users
PF
no control
Figure 3.12: Comparison of overall throughput for multiple secondary users.
PF spectrum access to that without access control (i.e., all service requests are
admitted with probability one). By optimizing the access probabilities, the pro-
posed scheme achieves 17% higher throughput on average, since the interference
is successfully alleviated. We also see that as the number of competing secondary
user increases, the average throughput for each user is greatly reduced, since the
spectrum competition becomes much heavier and each user has a smaller spectrum
share.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a primary-prioritized Markov approach for dynamic
spectrum access. We model the interactions between the primary users and the sec-
ondary users as continuous-time Markov chains, and optimize the state-dependent
access probabilities for secondary users so that the spectrum resources can be ef-
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ficiently and fairly shared by the secondary users in an opportunistic way without
interrupting the primary usage. The simulation results show that the proposed
spectrum access with PF criterion can achieve up to 95% performance gain over a
CSMA-based random access approach, and also achieves the optimal tradeoff be-





Good dynamic spectrum sharing schemes require precise spectrum sensing,
which is an essential functionality that prevents primary users from being interfered
by secondary users. Recent study has shown that cooperative spectrum sensing
with multiple secondary users can further improve the efficiency of primary user
detection.
However, in most of the existing cooperative spectrum sensing schemes as we
discuss in Chapter 2, a fully cooperative scenario is assumed: all secondary users
voluntarily contribute to sensing and fuse their detection results in every time slot
to a central controller (e.g., secondary base station), which makes a final decision.
However, sensing the primary band consumes a certain amount of energy and time
which may alternatively be diverted to data transmissions, and it may not be optimal
to have all users participate in sensing in every time slot, in order to guarantee a
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certain system performance. Moreover, with the emerging applications of mobile ad
hoc networks envisioned in civilian usage, the secondary users may be selfish and
not serve a common goal. If multiple secondary users occupy different sub-bands of
one primary user and can overhear the others’ sensing outcomes, they tend to take
advantage of the others and wait for the others to sense so as to reserve more time
for their own data transmission. Therefore, it is of great importance to study the
dynamic cooperative behaviors of selfish users in a competing environment while
boosting the system performance simultaneously.
In this chapter, we model cooperative spectrum sensing as an evolutionary
game, where the payoff is defined as the throughput of a secondary user. Evolution-
ary games have been previously applied to modeling networking problems, such as
resource sharing mechanism in P2P networks [AH07] and congestion control [WMd-
SeSa08] using behavioral experiments. In this chapter, we incorporate practical
multiuser effect and constraints into the spectrum sensing game. The secondary
users want to fulfill a common task, i.e., given a required detection probability to
protect the primary user from interference, sense the primary band collaboratively
for the sake of getting a high throughput by sharing the sensing cost. The users
who do not take part in cooperative sensing can overhear the sensing results and
have more time for their own data transmission. However, if no user spends time
in sensing the primary user, all of them may get a very low throughput. Therefore,
secondary users need to try different strategies at each time slot and learn the best
strategy from their strategic interactions using the methodology of understanding-
by-building.
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In order to study the evolution of secondary users’ strategies and answer the
question that how to cooperate in the evolutionary spectrum sensing game, we
propose to analyze the process of secondary users updating their strategy profile
with replicator dynamics equations [FL98], since a rational player should choose a
strategy more often if that strategy brings a relatively higher payoff. We derive
the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the game, and prove the convergence
to the ESS through analyzing the users’ behavior dynamics. Then we extend our
observation to a more general game with heterogeneous users, analyze the properties
of the ESSs, and develop a distributed learning algorithm so that the secondary users
approach the ESS only with their own payoff history. Simulation results show that
as the number of secondary users and the cost of sensing increases, the users tend
to have less incentive to contribute to cooperative sensing. However, in general they
can still achieve a higher average throughput in the spectrum sensing game than
that of the single-user sensing. Furthermore, using the proposed game can achieve
a higher total throughput than that of asking all users to contribute to sensing at
every time slot.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we present
the system model and formulate the multiuser cooperative spectrum sensing as a
game. In Section 4.2, we introduce the background on evolutionary game theory,
analyze the behavior dynamics and the ESS of the proposed game, and develop a
distributed learning algorithm for ESS. Simulation results are shown in Section 4.3.
Finally, we summarize the chapter in Section 4.4.
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4.1 System Model and Spectrum Sensing Game
4.1.1 Hypothesis of Channel Sensing
When a secondary user is sensing the licensed spectrum channel in a cognitive
radio network, the received signal r(t) from the detection has two hypotheses when
the primary user is present or absent, denoted by H1 and H0, respectively. Then,





hs(t) + w(t), if H1;
w(t), if H0.
(4.1)
In (4.1), h is the gain of the channel from the primary user’s transmitter to
the secondary user’s receiver, which is assumed to be slow flat fading; s(t) is the
signal of the primary user, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. random process with
mean zero and variance σ2s ; and w(t) is an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with mean zero and variance σ2w. Here s(t) and w(t) are assumed to be mutually
independent.
Assume we use an energy detector to sense the licensed spectrum, then the







where N is the number of collected samples.
The performance of licensed spectrum sensing is characterized by two proba-
bilities. The probability of detection, PD, represents the probability of detecting the
presence of primary user under hypothesis H1. The probability of false alarm, PF ,
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represents the probability of detecting the primary user’s presence under hypothesis
H0. The higher the PD, the better protection the primary user will receive; the
lower the PF , the more spectrum access the secondary user will obtain.
If the noise term w(t) is assumed to be circularly symmetric complex Gaus-
sian (CSCG), using central limit theorem the probability density function (PDF) of
the test statistics T (r) under H0 can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution
N (σ2w, 1N σ4w). Then, the probability of false alarm PF is given by [Poo94]









where λ is the threshold of the energy detector, and Q(·) denotes the complementary












Similarly, if we assume the primary signal is a complex PSK signal, then under
hypothesis H1, the PDF of T (r) can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution
N ((γ + 1)σ2w, 1N (2γ + 1)σ4w), where γ = |h|
2σ2s
σ2w
denotes the received signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of the primary user under H1. Then, the probability of detection PD











Given a target detection probability P̄D, the threshold λ can be derived, and
the probability of false alarm PF can be further rewritten as









where Q−1(·) denotes the inverse function of Q(·).
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4.1.2 Throughput of a Secondary User
When sensing the primary user’s activity, a secondary user cannot simultane-
ously perform data transmission. If we denote the sampling frequency by fs and
the frame duration by T , then the time duration for data transmission is given by
T − δ(N), where δ(N) = N
fs
represents the time spent in sensing.
When the primary user is absent and no false alarm is generated, the average




(1− PF )CH0 , (4.6)
where CH0 represents the data rate of the secondary user under H0. When the pri-
mary user is present, and not detected by the secondary user, the average throughput




(1− PD)CH1 , (4.7)
where CH1 represents the data rate of the secondary user under H1.
If we denote PH0 as the probability that the primary user is absent, then the
total throughput of a secondary user is
R(N) = PH0RH0(N) + (1− PH0)RH1(N). (4.8)
In dynamic spectrum access, it is required that the secondary users’ operation
should not conflict or interfere with the primary users, and PD should be one in
the ideal case. According to (4.5), however, PF is then also equal to one, and the
total throughput of a secondary user (4.8) is zero, which is impractical. Hence, a
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primary user who allows secondary spectrum access usually predetermines a target
detection probability P̄D very close to one [LYZH07], under which we assume the
secondary spectrum access will be prohibited as a punishment. Then, from the
secondary user’s perspective, he/she wants to maximize his/her total throughput
(4.8), given that PD ≥ P̄D. Since the target detection probability P̄D is required by
the primary user to be very close to 1, and we usually have CH1 < CH0 due to the
interference from the primary user to the secondary user, the second term in (4.8)
is much smaller than the first term and can be omitted. Therefore, (4.8) can be
approximated by
R̃(N) = PH0RH0(N) = PH0
T − δ(N)
T
(1− PF )CH0 . (4.9)
We know from (4.5) that given a target detection probability P̄D, PF is a
decreasing function of N . As a secondary user reduces N (or δ(N)) in the hope of
having more time for data transmission, PF will increase. This indicates a tradeoff
for the secondary user to choose an optimal N that maximizes the throughput R̃(N).
In order to reduce both PF and N , i.e., keep low false alarm PF with a smaller N ,
a good choice for a secondary user is to cooperatively sense the spectrum with the
other secondary users in the same licensed band.
4.1.3 Spectrum Sensing Game
A diagram of a cognitive radio network where multiple secondary users are
allowed to access one licensed spectrum band is shown in Figure 4.1, where we
assume that the secondary users within each others’ transmission range can exchange
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Figure 4.1: System model
their sensory data about primary user detection. The cooperative spectrum sensing
scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.2. We assume that the entire licensed band is
divided into K sub-bands, and each secondary user operates exclusively in one of
the K sub-bands when the primary user is absent. Transmission time is slotted into
intervals of length T . Before each data transmission, the secondary users need to
sense the primary user’s activity. Since the primary user will operate in all the sub-
bands once becoming active, the secondary users within each other’s transmission
range can jointly sense the primary user’s presence, and exchange their sensing
results via a narrow-band signalling channel, as shown in Fig 4.2. In this way, each
of them can spend less time detecting while enjoying a low false alarm probability
PF via some decision fusion rule [CV86], and the spectrum sensing cost (δ(N)) can
be shared by whoever is willing to contribute (C).
However, according to their locations and quality of the received primary sig-
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Figure 4.2: Cooperative spectrum sensing
nal, it may not be optimal to have all secondary users participate in spectrum sensing
at every time slot, in order to guarantee certain system performance. Moreover, all
secondary users cooperating in sensing may be difficult, if the users do not serve a
common authority, and instead act selfishly to maximize their own throughput. In
this case, once a secondary user is able to overhear the detection results from the
other users, he/she can take advantage of that by refusing to take part in spectrum
sensing, called denying (D). Although each secondary user in the cognitive radio
network still achieves the same false alarm probability PF , the users who refuse to
join in cooperative sensing have more time for their own data transmission. The
secondary users get a very low throughput if no one senses the spectrum, in the
hope that someone else does the job.
Therefore, we can model the spectrum sensing as a noncooperative game.
The players of the game are the secondary users, denoted by S = {s1, · · · , sK}.
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Each player sk has the same action/strategy space, denoted by A = {C,D}, where
“C” represents pure strategy contribute and “D” represents pure strategy refuse
to contribute (denying). The payoff function is defined as the throughput of the
secondary user. Assume that secondary users contributing to cooperative sensing
forms a set, denoted by Sc = {s1, · · · , sJ}. Denote the false alarm probability
of the cooperative sensing among set Sc with fusion rule “RULE” and a target




= PF (P̄D, N, {γi}i∈Sc , RULE). Then the payoff for





(1− P ScF )Csj , if |Sc| ∈ [1, K], (4.10)
where |Sc|, i.e., the cardinality of set Sc, represents the number of contributors, and
Csj is the data rate for user sj under hypothesis H0. The payoff for a user si /∈ Sc,
who selects strategy D, is then given by
ŨD,si = PH0(1− P ScF )Csi , if |Sc| ∈ [1, K − 1], (4.11)
since si will not spend time sensing. If no secondary user contributes to sensing and
waits for the others to sense, i.e., |Sc| = 0, from (4.5), we know that limN→0 PF = 1,
especially for the low received SNR regime and high P̄D requirement. In this case,
the payoff for a denier becomes
ŨD,si = 0, if |Sc| = 0. (4.12)
The decision fusion rule can be selected as the logical-OR rule, logical-AND
rule, or majority rule [LYZH07]. In this chapter, we use the majority rule to derive
the P ScF , though the other fusion rules could be similarly analyzed. Denote the
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detection and false alarm probability for a contributor sj ∈ Sc by PD,sj and PF,sj ,
respectively. Then, under the majority rule we have the following
PD = Pr[at least half users in Sc report H1|H1], (4.13)
and
PF = Pr[at least half users in Sc report H1|H0], (4.14)
Hence, given a P̄D for set Sc, each individual user’s target detection probability P̄D,sj









P̄ kD,sj(1− P̄D,sj)|Sc|−k, (4.15)
where we assume each contributor sj ∈ Sc takes equal responsibility in making the
final decision for fairness concern and therefore P̄D,sj is identical for all sj’s. Then,
from (4.5) we can write PF,sj as
PF,sj = Q
(√





and can further obtain P ScF by substituting (4.16) in (4.14).
4.2 Evolutionary Sensing Game and Strategy
Analysis
In this section, we first introduce the concept of ESS, and then use replicator
dynamics to model and analyze the behavior dynamics of the secondary users in the
sensing game.
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4.2.1 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Evolutionary game theory provides a good means to address the strategic
uncertainty that a player faces in a game by taking out-of-equilibrium behavior,
learning during the strategic interactions, and approaching a robust equilibrium
strategy. Such an equilibrium strategy concept widely adopted in evolutionary game
theory is the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [Smi82], which is “a strategy such
that, if all members of the population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade
the population under the influence of natural selection”. Let us define the expected
payoff as the individual fitness, and use π(p, p̂) to denote the payoff of an individual
using strategy p against another individual using strategy p̂. Then, we have the
following formal definition of an ESS [Smi82].
Definition 1 A strategy p∗ is an ESS if and only if, for all p 6= p∗,
1. π(p, p∗) ≤ π(p∗, p∗), (equilibrium condition)
2. if π(p, p∗) = π(p∗, p∗), π(p, p) < π(p∗, p) (stability condition).
Condition 1) states that p∗ is the best response strategy to itself, and is hence a
Nash equilibrium (NE). Condition 2) is interpreted as a stability condition. Suppose
that the incumbents play p∗, and a collection of mutants play p. Then conditions 1)
and 2) ensure that as long as the fraction of mutants playing p is not too large, the
average payoff to p will fall short of that to p∗. Since strategies with a higher fitness
value are expected to propagate faster in a population through strategic interactions,
evolution will cause the population using mutation strategy p to decrease until the
entire population uses strategy p∗.
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Since data transmission for each secondary user is continuous, the spectrum
sensing game is played repeatedly and evolves over time. Moreover, new secondary
users may join in the spectrum sensing game from time to time, and the existing
secondary users may even be unaware of their appearance and strategies. Hence,
a stable strategy which is robust to mutants using different strategies is especially
preferred. Therefore, we propose to use evolutionary game theory [Wei95] to analyze
the behavior dynamics of the players and further derive the ESS.
4.2.2 Evolution Dynamics of the Sensing Game
When a set of rational players are uncertain of each other’s actions and util-
ities, they will try different strategies in every play and learn from the strategic
interactions using the methodology of understanding-by-building. During the pro-
cess, the percentage (or population share) of players using a certain pure strategy
may change. Such a population evolution is characterized by replicator dynamics in
evolutionary game theory. Specifically, consider a population of homogeneous indi-
viduals with identical data rate Csi and received primary SNR γi. The players adopt
the same set of pure strategies A. Since all players have the same Csi and γi, payoffs
for playing a particular strategy depend only on the other strategies employed, not
on who is playing them. Therefore, all players have the same payoff function U .
At time t, let pai(t) ≥ 0 be the number of individuals who are currently using pure
strategy ai ∈ A, and let p(t) =
∑
ai∈A pai(t) > 0 be the total population. Then
the associated population state is defined as the vector x(t) = {xa1(t), · · · , x|A|(t)},
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where xai(t) is defined as the population share xai(t) = pai(t)/p(t). By replica-
tor dynamics, at time t the evolution dynamics of xai(t) is given by the following
differential equation [Wei95]
ẋai = ε[Ū(ai, x−ai)− Ū(x)]xai , (4.17)
where Ū(ai, x−ai) is the average payoff of the individuals using pure strategy ai, x−ai
is the set of population shares who use pure strategies other than ai, Ū(x) is the
average payoff of the whole population, and ε is some positive number representing
the time scale. The intuition behind (4.17) is as follows: if strategy ai results in a
higher payoff than the average level, the population share using ai will grow, and the
growth rate ẋai/xai is proportional to the difference between strategy ai’s current
payoff and the current average payoff in the entire population. By analogy, we can
view xai(t) as the probability that one player adopts pure strategy ai, and x(t) can
be equivalently viewed as a mixed strategy for that player.
For the spectrum sensing game with heterogeneous players, whose γi and/or
Csi are different from each other, denote the probability that user sj adopts strategy
h ∈ A at time t by xh,sj(t), then the time evolution of xh,sj(t) is governed by the






where Ūsj(h, x−sj) is the average payoff for player sj using pure strategy h, and
Ūsj(x) is sj’s average payoff using mixed strategy xsj .
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4.2.3 Sensing Game with Homogeneous Players
A strategy is ESS if and only if it is asymptotically stable to the replicator dy-
namics [Wei95] [Sam98]. Therefore, we can derive the ESS of the proposed spectrum
sensing game by proving its asymptotical stability. In this subsection, we study the
ESS of games with homogeneous players, and will discuss the heterogeneous case in
the next.
As shown in Figure 4.1, players of the sensing game are secondary users within
each other’s transmission range. If the transmission range is small, we can approx-
imately view that all the received γsj ’s are very similar to each other. As the γsj ’s
are usually very low, in order to guarantee a low PF given a target P̄D, the number
of sampled signals N should be large. Under these assumptions, we can approxi-
mately view P ScF as the same for different Sc’s, denoted by P̂F . Further assume that
all users have the same data rate, i.e. Csi = C, for all si ∈ S. Then, the payoff












U0, if J ∈ [1, K − 1];
0, if J = 0,
(4.20)
where U0 = PH0(1− P̂F )C, J = |Sc|, and τ = δ(N)T .
As the secondary users are homogeneous players, (4.17) can be applied to the
special case as all players have the same evolution dynamics and equilibrium strategy.
Denote x as the probability that one secondary user contributes to spectrum sensing,
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xj(1− x)K−1−j is the probability that J + 1 users contributes to coop-









Since the average payoff Ū(x) = xŪC + (1− x)ŪD, then (4.17) becomes
ẋ = εx(1− x)[ŪC(x)− ŪD(x)
]
. (4.23)
In equilibrium x∗, no player will deviate from the optimal strategy, indicating ẋ∗ = 0,
and we obtain x∗ = 0, or 1, or the solution of Ū∗C(x) = Ū
∗
D(x).
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with Mt = (1−x)K−1U0(1−τ). By using L’Hôpital’s rule, we know that limx→0 ŪC(x)−
ŪD(x) = limx→0 U0K [−Kτ(1 − x)K−1 + K(1 − x)K−1 − Kx(K − 1)(1 − x)K−2] =
U0(1 − τ) > 0. Thus, x = 0 is not a solution to equation ŪC(x) − ŪD(x) = 0, and
the solution satisfies
τ(1− x∗)K + Kx∗(1− x∗)K−1 − τ = 0. (4.25)
Next we show that the dynamics defined in (4.17) converge to the above-
mentioned equilibriums, which are asymptotically stable and hence the ESS. Note
that the variable in (4.17) is the probability that a user chooses strategy ai ∈ {C, D},
so we need to guarantee that xC(t) + xD(t) = 1 in the dynamic process. We show
this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The sum of the probability that a secondary user chooses strategy
“C” and “D” is equal to one in the replicator dynamics of a symmetric sensing
game.
Proof. Summing xai in (4.17) over ai yields
ẋC + ẋD = ε[xCŪ(C, xD) + xDŪ(D, xC)− (xC + xD)Ū(x)]. (4.26)
Since Ū(x) = xCŪ(C, xD) + xDŪ(D, xC), and initially a user chooses xC + xD = 1,
(4.26) is reduced to ẋC + ẋD = 0. Therefore, xC(t)+xD(t) = 1 holds at any t during
the dynamic process. A similar conclusion also holds in an asymmetric game. N
In order to prove that the replicator dynamics converge to the equilibrium, we
first show that all non-equilibria strategies of the sensing game will be eliminated
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during the dynamic process. It suffices to prove that (4.17) is a myopic adjustment
dynamic [FL98].
Definition 2 A system is a myopic adjustment dynamic if
∑
h∈A
Ūsj(h, x−sj)ẋh,sj ≥ 0, ∀sj ∈ S. (4.27)
Inequality (4.27) indicates that the average utility of a player will not decrease in a
myopic adjustment dynamic system. We then prove that the dynamics (4.17) satisfy
Definition 2.
Proposition 2 The replicator dynamics (4.17) are myopic adjustment dynamics.



















According to Jensen’s inequality, we know (4.28) is non-negative, which completes
the proof. In addition, we can show (4.27) also holds for a game with heterogeneous
players in a similar way. N
In the following theorem, we show that the replicator dynamics in (4.17) con-
verge to the ESS.
Theorem 1 Starting from any interior point x ∈ (0, 1), the replicator dynamics
defined in (4.17) converge to the ESS x∗.
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Proof. From the simplified dynamics (4.23), we know that the sign of ẋC(t) is
determined by the sign of ŪC(x) − ŪD(x), given x ∈ (0, 1) and ε > 0. ŪC(x) and
ŪD(x) are simplified as the following










ŪD(x) = U0 − U0(1− x)K−1.
(4.29)
Furthermore, the difference ŪC(x)− ŪD(x) is calculated in Appendix ?? as
ŪC(x)− ŪD(x) = U0
K
[




According to different values of parameter τ , we prove the theorem in three different
cases.
Case I (τ = 1): from (4.29) we know ŪC(x) < ŪD(x),
dx
dt
< 0, and the replicator
dynamics converge to x∗ = 0.
Case II (τ = 0): from (4.29) we have ŪC(x) > ŪD(x),
dx
dt
> 0, and the
replicator dynamics converge to x∗ = 1.
Case III (0 < τ < 1): Define Φ(x) = ŪC(x) − ŪD(x) = U0Kxf(x), with f(x) =
τ(1− x)K + Kx(1− x)K−1− τ . When x → 0, using L’Hôpital’s rule, we know from
(4.30) that limx→0 Φ(x) = (1 − τ)U0 > 0. When x → 1, limx→1 Φ(x) = − τK < 0.
Since Φ(0) > 0, Φ(1) < 0, and Φ(x) is a continuous function of x in (0, 1), then Φ(x)
must have at least one intersection with the x-axis, i.e., ∃x̃, such that Φ(x̃) = 0. If
there is only one such x̃, then we can infer that Φ(x) > 0 when x < x̃, and Φ(x) < 0
when x > x̃. Since Φ(x) has the same sign as f(x) when 0 < x < 1, it suffices
to prove that there exists only one solution in (0, 1) to equation f(x) = 0. Taking
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derivative of f(x) with respect to x, we get
df(x)
dx
= (1− x)K−2[− (K − τ)x + (1− τ)]. (4.31)




= 0. Observing (4.31) we find that f(x) is increasing when 0 <
x < 1−τ
K−τ with f(0) = 0, while decreasing when
1−τ
K−τ < x < 1 with f(1) = −τ < 0.
This means equation f(x) = 0 has only one root x∗ in (0, 1), which is the equilibrium
solved in (4.25). When 0 < x < x∗, f(x) > 0; and when x∗ < x < 1, f(x) < 0. Since
Φ(x) has the same sign as f(x), we can conclude that for 0 < x < x∗, Φ(x) > 0,
i.e., dx
dt
> 0; for x∗ < x < 1, Φ(x) < 0, i.e., dx
dt
< 0. Thus, the replicator dynamics
converge to the equilibrium x∗.
Therefore, we have proved the convergence of replicator dynamics to the ESS
x∗. N
4.2.4 Sensing Game with Heterogeneous Players
For games with heterogeneous players, it is generally very difficult to represent
Ūsj(h, x−sj) in a compact form, and directly obtain the ESS in closed-form by solving
(4.18). Therefore, we first analyze a two-user game to gain some insight, then
generalize the observation to a multi-user game.
When there are two secondary users in the cognitive radio network, i.e., S =
{s1, s2}, according to equations (4.10)-(4.12) we can write the payoff matrix as
in Table 4.1, where for simplicity we define A
4
= 1 − P ScF , with Sc = {s1, s2},
Bi
4
= 1− PF,si , Di
4




Let us denote x1 and x2 as the probability that user 1 and user 2 take action
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Table 4.1: Payoff table of a two-user sensing game
C D
C D1A(1− τ2 ),D2A(1− τ2 ) D1B1(1− τ),D2B1
D D1B2,D2B2(1− τ) 0,0
“C”, respectively, then we have the expected payoff Ūs1(C, x2) when user 1 chooses
to contribute to sensing as
Ūs1(C, x2) = D1A(1−
τ
2
)x2 + D1B1(1− τ)(1− x2), (4.32)




)x1x2 + D1B1(1− τ)x1(1− x2) + D1B2(1− x1)x2. (4.33)
Thus we get the replicator dynamics equation of user 1 according to (4.18) as





where E1 = B2 + B1(1− τ)−A(1− τ2 ). Similarly the replicator dynamics equation
of user 2 is written as





where E2 = B1 + B2(1− τ)− A(1− τ2 ).
At equilibrium we know ẋ1 = 0 and ẋ2 = 0, then from (4.34) and (4.35) we









According to [Cre03], if an equilibrium of the replicator dynamics equations is
a locally asymptotically stable point in a dynamic system, it is an ESS. So we can
view (4.34) and (4.35) as a nonlinear dynamic system and judge whether the five
equilibria are ESSs by analyzing the Jacobian matrix. By taking partial derivatives




D1(1− 2x1)E11 −x1(1− x1)D1E1
−x2(1− x2)D2E2 (1− 2x2)D2E22

 , (4.36)
where E11 = B1(1− τ)− E1x2, and E22 = B2(1− τ)− E2x1.
The asymptotical stability requires that det(Jm) > 0 and tr(Jm) <0. Substi-
tuting the five equilibria mentioned above to (4.36), we can conclude that
1. When A(1 − τ
2
) < B1, there is one ESS (1, 0), and the strategy profile user 1
and user 2 adopt converges to (C,D);
2. When A(1− τ
2
) < B2, there is one ESS (0, 1), and the strategy profile converges
to (D,C);
3. When A(1 − τ
2
) > B2 and A(1 − τ2 ) > B1, there is one ESS (1, 1), and the
strategy profiles converges to (C,C);
4. When A(1− τ
2
) < B1 and A(1− τ2 ) < B2, there are two ESSs (1, 0) and (0, 1),
and the strategy profile converges to (C,D) or (D,C) depending on different
initial strategy profiles.
In order to explain the above-mentioned conclusions and generalize them to a
multi-player game, we next analyze the properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium,
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Inequality (4.38) holds because A(1 − τ/2) − B1 < 0; otherwise x∗1 = B2(1−τ)E2 > 1,
which is impractical. Inequality (4.39) holds because in practical applications, we




From (4.37) we know that when cooperative sensing brings a greater gain, i.e.,
as A increases, x∗1 (and x
∗
2) increases. This is why when A(1 − τ2 ) > Bi, i = 1, 2,
the strategy profile converges to (C,C). From (4.38) we find that the incentive of
a secondary user si contributing to cooperative sensing decreases as the other user
sj’s detection performance increases. This is because when user si learns through
repeated interactions that sj has a better Bj, si tends not to sense the spectrum
and enjoys a free-ride. Then sj has to sense the spectrum; otherwise, he is at the
risk of having no one sense and receiving a very low expected payoff. That is why
when A(1− τ
2
) < B1 (or A(1− τ2 ) < B2), the strategy profile converges to (C,D) (or
(D,C)). When the sensing cost (τ) becomes larger, the secondary users will be more
reluctant to contribute to cooperative sensing and x∗1 decreases, as shown in (4.39).
From the above-mentioned observation, we can infer that if some user si has
a better detection performance Bi, the other users tend to take advantage of si. If
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there are more than two users in the sensing game, the strategy of the users with
worse Bi’s (and γi’s) will converge to “D”. Using replicator dynamics, users with
better detection performance tend to contribute to spectrum sensing, because they
are aware of the low throughput if no one senses the spectrum. Similarly, if the
secondary users have different data rates, the user with a lower rate Csj tends to
take advantage of those with higher rates, since the latter suffer relatively heavier
losses if no one contributes to sensing and they have to become more active in
sensing.
The work in [PL07] discussed how to select a proper subset of secondary users
in cooperative sensing so as to optimize detection performance. However, their
approach assumes that the information about the received SNR’s (γi’s) is available
at the secondary base station. In our evolutionary game framework, the secondary
users can learn the ESS by using replicator dynamics only with their own payoff
history. Therefore, it is suitable for distributed implementation when there exists no
secondary base station and the secondary users behave selfishly. In the next section
we propose a distributed learning algorithm and further justify the convergence with
computer simulations.
4.2.5 Learning Algorithm for ESS
In the above cooperative sensing games with multiple players, we have shown
that the ESS is solvable. However, solving the equilibrium requires the knowledge
of utility function as well as exchange of private information (e.g., γsj and Csj)
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and strategies adopted by the other users. This results in a lot of communication
overhead. Therefore, a distributed learning algorithm that gradually converges to
the ESS without too much information exchange is preferred.
From (4.18), we can derive the strategy adjustment for the secondary user as
follows. Denote the pure strategy taken by user sj at time t by Asj(t). Define an





1, if Asj(t) = h;
0, if Asj(t) 6= h.
(4.40)














where Ũsj(Asj(t), A−sj(t)) is the payoff value for sj as determined by (4.10)-(4.12).









Then, the derivative ẋh,sj (mT ) can be approximated by substituting the estimations
(4.41) and (4.42) into (4.18). Therefore, the probability of user sj taking action h
can be adjusted by
xh,sj ((m + 1)T ) = xh,sj (mT ) + ηsj ẋh,sj (mT ) , (4.43)
with ηsj being the step size of adjustment chosen by sj.
Eq. (4.43) can be viewed as a discrete-time replicator dynamic system. It
has been shown in [HS74] that if a steady state is hyperbolic and asymptotically
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stable under the continuous-time dynamics, then it is asymptotically stable for suf-
ficiently small time periods in corresponding discrete-time dynamics. Since the ESS
is the asymptotically stable point in the continuous-time replicator dynamics and
also hyperbolic [FL98], if a player knows precise information about ẋh,sj , adapting
strategies according to (4.43) can converge to an ESS. With the learning algorithm,
users will try different strategies in every time slot, accumulate information about
the average payoff values based on (4.41) and (4.42), calculate the probability change
of some strategy using (4.18), and adapt their actions to an equilibrium.
By summarizing the above learning algorithm and analysis in this section, we
can arrive at the following cooperation strategy in the de-centralized cooperative
spectrum sensing:
Cooperation Strategy in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing:
Denote the probability of contributing to sensing for user si ∈ S by xc,si , then
the following strategy will be used by si:
• if starting with a high xc,si , si will rely more on the others and reduce xc,si
until further reduction of xc,si decreases his throughput or xc,si approaches 0.
• if starting with a low xc,si , si will gradually increase xc,si until further increase
of xc,si decreases his throughput or xc,si approaches 1.
• si shall reduce xc,si by taking advantage of those users with better detection
performance or higher data rates.
• si shall increase xc,si if cooperation with more users can bring a better detection
performance than the case of single-user sensing without cooperation.
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4.3 Simulation Studies
The parameters used in the simulation are as follows. We assume that the
primary signal is a baseband QPSK modulated signal, the sampling frequency is
fs = 1MHz, and the frame duration is T = 20 ms. The probability that the primary
user is inactive is set as PH0 = 0.9, and the required target detection probability
P̄D is 0.95. The noise is assumed to be a zero-mean CSCG process. The distance
between the cognitive radio network and the primary base station is very large, so
the received γsj ’s are in the low SNR regime, with an average value of −12 dB.
4.3.1 Sensing Game with Homogeneous Players
We first illustrate the ESS of the secondary users in a homogeneous K-user
sensing game as in Section 4.2.3, where the data rate is C = 1 Mbps. In Figure
4.3(a), we show the equilibrium probability of being a contributor x∗. The x-axis
represents τ = δ(N)
T
, the ratio of sensing time duration over the frame duration.
From Figure 4.3(a), we can see that x∗ decreases as τ increases. For the same
τ , x∗ decreases as the number of secondary users increases. This indicates that the
incentive of contributing to cooperative sensing drops as the cost of sensing increases
and more users exist in the network. This is because the players tend to wait for
someone else to sense the spectrum and can then enjoy a free ride, when they are
faced with a high sensing cost and more counterpart players. In Figure 4.3(b), we
show the average throughput per user when all users adopt the equilibrium strategy.
We see that there is a tradeoff between the cost of sensing and the throughput for an
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(a) Probability of being a contributor




































(b) Average throughput per user
Figure 4.3: ESS and average throughput vs. τ .
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arbitrary number of users, and the optimal value of τ is around 0.25. For comparison,
we also plot the throughput for a single-user sensing (dotted line “single”), where
the optimal value of τ is around 0.15. Although the cost of sensing increases, we
see that as more users share the sensing cost, the average throughput per user still
increases, and the average throughput values for the cooperative sensing game are
higher than that of the single-user sensing case.
4.3.2 Convergence of the Dynamics
In Figure 4.4, we show the replicator dynamics of the game with homogeneous
users, where τ = 0.5. We observe in Figure 4.4(a) that starting from a high initial
probability of cooperation, all users gradually reduce their degree of cooperation,
because being a free-rider more often saves more time for one’s own data transmission
and brings a higher throughput. However, too low a degree of cooperation greatly
increases the chance of having no user contribute to sensing, so the users become
more cooperative starting from a low initial probability of cooperation as shown in
Figure 4.4(b). It takes less than 20 iterations to attain the equilibrium by choosing
a proper step size ηsi = 3.
In Figure 4.5, we show the replicator dynamics for the game with three het-
erogeneous players, using the learning algorithm discussed in Section 4.2.5. We
choose τ = 0.5, γ1 = −14 dB, γ2 = −10 dB, and γ3 = −10 dB. As expected,
starting from a low initial probability of cooperation, the users tend to increase the
degree of cooperation. During the iterations, the users with a worse γi (user 1) learn
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(a) initial x = 0.8
































(b) initial x = 0.2
Figure 4.4: Behavior dynamics of a homogeneous K-user sensing game
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Figure 4.5: Behavior dynamics of a heterogeneous 3-user sensing game
that listening to the detection results from the users with a better γi can bring a
higher throughput. Hence, user 1’s strategy converges to “D” in the long run, while
the users with better detection performance (user 2 and user 3) have to sense the
spectrum to guarantee their own throughput.
4.3.3 Comparison of ESS and Full Cooperation
In Figure 4.6, we compare the total throughput of a 3-user sensing game
using their ESS and the total throughput when the users always participate in
cooperative sensing and share the sensing cost, i.e., xsi = 1. In the first four groups
of comparison we assume a homogeneous setting, where γi of each user takes value
from {−13,−14,−15,−16} dB, respectively. In the last four groups, a heterogeneous
setting is assumed, where γ1 equals to {−12,−13,−14,−15} dB, respectively, and
γ2 and γ3 are kept the same as in the homogeneous setting. We find in the figure that
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of ESS and full cooperation
using ESS has better performance than all secondary users cooperating in sensing
at every time slot. This is because under ESS, the users can take turns to jointly
complete the common task, and on average contribute less time to sensing and enjoy
a higher throughput. This indicates that in order to guarantee a certain detection
performance, it is not necessary to force all users to contribute in every time slot,
and ESS can achieve a satisfying system performance even when there exist selfish
users.
4.4 Summary
Cooperative spectrum sensing with multiple secondary users has been shown
to achieve a better detection performance than single-user sensing without coop-
eration. However, how to collaborate in cooperative spectrum sensing over de-
centralized cognitive radio networks is still an open problem, as selfish users are
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not willing to contribute their energy/time to sensing. In this chapter, we propose
an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to develop the best cooperation strategy
for cooperative sensing with selfish users. Using replicator dynamics, users can try
different strategies and learn a better strategy through strategic interactions. We
study the behavior dynamics of secondary users, derive and analyze the property
of the ESSs, and further propose a distributed learning algorithm that aids the sec-
ondary users approach the ESSs only with their own payoff history. From simulation
results we find that the proposed game has a better performance than having all
secondary users sense at every time slot, in terms of total throughput. Moreover,
the average throughput per user in the sensing game is higher than in the single-user
sensing case without user cooperation.
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Chapter 5
Stackelberg Game for Distributed
Resource Allocation in
Cooperative Networks
Recently, cooperative communications [LTW04] have gained much attention
as an emerging transmit strategy for future wireless networks. The basic idea is that
relay nodes can act as a virtual antenna array to help the source node forward its
information to the destination. In this way, cooperative communication efficiently
takes advantage of the broadcasting nature of wireless networks. Besides, it exploits
the inherent spatial and multiuser diversities.
In order to improve the performance of cooperative transmissions, it is very
important to design efficient resource allocation, such as relay selection, power con-
trol, and reply deployment. However, most existing works described in Chapter 2
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solve resource allocation problems in cooperative communications by means of a
centralized fashion. Such schemes require that complete and precise channel state
information (CSI) should be available in order to optimize the system performance,
which are generally neither scalable nor robust to channel estimation errors. This
fact motivates the research on distributed resource allocation without requiring CSI.
For distributed resource allocation, there are two main questions over multiuser co-
operative wireless networks: First, among all the distributed nodes, who can help
relay and improve the source node’s link quality better; Second, for the selected relay
nodes, how much power they need to transmit. Moreover, in multiuser cooperative
wireless networks with selfish nodes, different nodes may belong to a different au-
thorities. Therefore, a mechanism of reimbursement to relay nodes is needed such
that relay nodes can earn benefits from spending their own transmission power in
helping the source node forward its information. On the other hand, if the source
node reimburses relay nodes for their help, it needs to choose the most beneficial
relay nodes.
According to such characteristics, in this chapter, we employ a Stackelberg
game [FT93] to jointly consider the benefits of the source node and relay nodes in
cooperative communications. The game is divided into two levels. The source node
plays the buyer-level game, since it aims to achieve the best performance with the
relay nodes’ help with the least reimbursements to them. We analyze how many and
which relay nodes are selected by the source node to participate in relaying after
they announce their optimal prices. In addition, we optimize how much service (such
as power) the source node will buy from each relay node. On the other hand, each
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relay node plays the seller-level game, in which it aims to earn the payment that
not only covers its forwarding cost but also gains as many extra profits as possible.
Therefore, the relay node needs to set the optimal price per unit for the service, so
as to maximize its own benefit. To study the game outcomes, we analyze several
properties of the proposed game. Then, we develop a distributed algorithm that
can converge to the optimal game equilibrium.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.1, we de-
scribe the system model, and formulate the cooperative optimization as a Stackel-
berg game. We construct the distributed implementation of multiuser cooperation
transmissions and provide the solutions in Section 5.2. Simulation results are shown
in Section 5.3. Finally, we present the summary in Section 5.4.
5.1 System Description
In this section, we first derive the expression of the maximal achievable rate in
cooperative transmission with relay nodes’ help. Then, we formulate the optimiza-
tion problem of relay selection and power control using a Stackelberg game.
5.1.1 System Model
In the sequel, we employ the amplify-and-forward (AF) cooperation proto-
col [LTW04] as our system model; other cooperation protocols [LTW04] can be
considered in a similar way. The system diagrams are shown in Figure 5.1, in which
there are in total N relay nodes, one source node s and one destination node d. The
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Figure 5.1: System diagrams.
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cooperative transmission consists of two phases.
In Phase 1, source node s broadcasts its information to both destination node
d and each relay node ri. The received signals ys,d and ys,ri at node d and node ri
can be expressed as
ys,d =
√




PsGs,rix + ηs,ri , (5.2)
where Ps represents the transmit power at node s, x is the broadcast information
symbol with unit energy from node s to node d and node ri, Gs,d and Gs,ri are the
channel gains from node s to node d and node ri respectively, and ηs,d and ηs,ri are
the additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the noise power is the same for all the links, denoted by σ2. We also assume
the channels are stable over each transmission frame.
Without the relay nodes’ help, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) that results





and the rate of the direct transmission is







where W is the bandwidth for transmission, and Γ is a constant representing the
capacity gap.
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In Phase 2, relay node ri amplifies ys,ri and forwards it to destination d with
transmitted power Pri . The received signal at destination node d is
yri,d =
√






is the transmitted signal from node ri to node d that is normalized to have unit
energy, Gri,d is the channel gain from node ri to node d, and ηri,d is the received













σ2(PriGri,d + PsGs,ri + σ
2)
. (5.8)
Therefore, by (5.4) and (5.8), we have the rate at the output of the maximal-ratio











If the relay nodes available to help source node s at a certain time constitute a set,
denoted by L = {r1, . . . , rN}, then we have










where γL denotes a bandwidth factor.
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According to different network applications, γL can have different definitions.
For the energy-constrained networks, γL is set to 1. For the network with a limited
bandwidth, the bandwidth should be divided for the source node and relay nodes,
and γL depends on the number of relay nodes that actually help forwarding, since not
all the relay nodes will contribute to a better performance for the source node. If N ′
out of N relay nodes are selected by the source node, N ′ ≤ N , then γL = 1N ′+1 .1We
will study the energy constrained scenario first, then we show the effects of the
varying γL in the simulation part.
5.1.2 Problem Formulation
To exploit the cooperative diversity for multiuser systems, from (5.10), two
fundamental questions on resource allocation need to be answered: First, which relay
nodes will be included; Second, what is the optimal power Pri . However, solving
these issues in a centralized manner requires accurate and complete channel-state
information (CSI), bringing considerable overheads and signaling of information
about channel estimations. In contrast, the distributed resource allocation only
needs local knowledge about channel information. Moreover, in general, nodes in
multiuser cooperative wireless networks may belong to different authorities and act
selfishly. Incentives need to be provided by the source node to the relay nodes for
relaying the information. Consequently, the source node needs to choose the most
beneficial relay nodes. According to the behaviors of the source node and the relay
1The source node can know the number of available relay nodes by broadcasting its signal and
listening to the relay nodes’ feedback on whether to help forward the source node’s information.
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nodes, we employ a distributed resource allocation using a Stackelberg-game based
scheme as the following formulated problem.
(1) Source Node/Buyer: The source node s can be modeled as a buyer
and aims to obtain most benefits at least possible payments. The utility function of
source node s can be defined as
Us = aRs,r,d −M, (5.11)
where Rs,r,d denotes the achievable rate with the relay nodes’ help, a denotes the




piPri = p1Pr1 + p2Pr2 + · · ·+ pNPrN (5.12)
represents the total payments paid by source node s to the relay nodes. In (5.12),
pi represents the price per unit of power selling from relay node ri to source node s,
and Pri denotes how much power node s will buy from node ri.
The relay nodes helping source node s constitute a set, still denoted by L,




Us = aRs,r,d −M, s.t. Pri ≥ 0, ri ∈ L. (5.13)
(2) Relay Node/Seller: Each relay node ri can be seen as a seller and aims
to not only earn the payment which covers its forwarding cost but also gain as many
extra profits as possible. We introduce a parameter ci, the cost of power for relaying
data, in our formulation. Then, relay node ri’s utility function can be defined as
Uri = piPri − ciPri = (pi − ci)Pri , (5.14)
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where Pri is the source node’s power consumption by optimizing Us described in
(5.13). The optimization problem for relay node ri, or the seller-level game is:
max
pi>0
Uri = (pi − ci)Pri , ∀i. (5.15)
The choice of the optimal price pi is not only affected by each relay node’s own
channel conditions to the source node and the destination node, but also by the other
relay nodes’ prices. This is because the seller-level game is non-cooperative, and the
relay nodes compete to get selected by source node s. If a certain relay node rj
asks such a high price that makes it less beneficial than the other relay nodes to
source node s, then source node s will buy less from relay node rj or even discard
it. On the other hand, if the price is too low, the profit obtained by (5.14) will be
unnecessarily low. Overall, there is a tradeoff for setting the price. If under the
optimal price, denoted by p∗i , the resulting utility of relay node ri is negative, i.e.,
U∗ri ≤ 0, then node ri will quit the seller-level game since it can not cover the basic
cost by selling power to the source node.
It is worth noticing that the only signaling required to exchange between the
source node and the relay nodes are the price pi and the information about how much
power Pri to buy. Consequently, the proposed two-level game-theoretic approach can
be implemented in a distributed way. The outcome of the proposed games will be
shown in detail in the following section.
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5.2 Analysis of the Proposed Games
In this section, we first obtain closed-form solutions to the outcomes of the
proposed games. Then, we prove that these solutions are the global optima, and
further show that the set of solutions is a unique fixed point and the proposed
game converges to that point. Finally, we compare the performance of the proposed
distributed scheme to that of a centralized scheme.
5.2.1 Buyer-Level Game for the Source Node
Relay Selection
As relay nodes are located in different places and ask different prices for helping
the source node, it may not be good for source node s to choose all relay nodes,
especially those with bad channel conditions but asking a high price. Moreover, if
the source node will exclude the less beneficial relay nodes sooner or later during
the buyer-level game, it is better to reject them at the beginning so as to reduce the
signaling overhead. Because source node s aims at maximizing utility Us through
buying an optimal amount of power Pri , then a natural way of relay selection for




Since source node s gradually increases the amount of power bought from the relay
nodes to approach the optimum, by observing the sign of ∂Us
∂Pri
when Pri = 0, node
s can exclude (or select) those less (or more) beneficial relay nodes.






− pi, i = 1, · · · , N. (5.16)
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When Prj = 0, j = 1, · · · , N , if pi satisfies pi < a ∂Rs,r,d∂Pri for relay node ri, then we
have ∂Us
∂Pri
> 0, meaning the source node will obtain a larger Us by increasing Pri .
Otherwise, relay node ri should be excluded.
Then a question is how each relay node ri asks its price pi at the beginning.
Since in a distributed implementation, each relay node does not know the other
relay nodes’ prices, it is natural to first tentatively set pi = ci. If the initial price
pi is lower than ci, utility Uri will be negative and hence impractical; on the other
hand, if the initial price is greater than ci, relay node ri may be at the risk of
being excluded by the source node. If under these lowest initial prices, the source
node would choose not to buy any power from some relay node ri, then ri will not
participate in the seller-level game because Uri = 0.
To summarize the analysis above, the relay rejection criteria of the source
node are as follows. Assume the total number of the relay nodes is N . At first the
source node tentatively chooses Pri = 0, i = 1, · · · , N , and all the relay nodes set
their initial prices as pi = ci,∀i. For relay node rj, if cj ≥ (a ∂Rs,r,d∂Prj ), then rj is
rejected by the source node with correspondingly Prj = 0. It will be shown later
that this rejection is fixed and will not change after the game is played.
With the proposed relay rejection criteria, source node s can exclude the least
beneficial relay nodes at the very beginning. In this way, the signaling overhead can
be further reduced, because the source node and the rejected relay nodes no longer
need to exchange their information about the purchased power and prices.
Optimal Power Allocation for the Selected Relay Nodes
After the selection, for the selected relay nodes that constitute a set Lh =
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{r1, · · · , rN ′}, we can solve the optimal power Pri by taking derivative of Us in






− pi = 0, ri ∈ Lh. (5.17)
For simplicity, define C = 1 +
Γs,d
Γ
, W ′ = aW
ln 2
. By (5.10), we get the first term
of Us as

































































Since the left-hand side (LHS) of (5.21) is the same for any relay node on the right-





(Pri + Bi)−Bj. (5.22)





















































Substituting (5.24) into (5.21), after some manipulations, we can have a quadratic







Y 2 + 4XW ′
2X
−Bi, (5.25)
where X = 1 +
∑





The solution in (5.25) can also be verified by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
condition [Bar93] to be the global optimum to problem (5.13), since the Us function
is concave in {Pri}Ni=1 and the supporting set {Pri|Pri ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N} is convex.
5.2.2 Seller-Level Game for the Relay Nodes
Substituting (5.25) into (5.15), we have
max
{pi}>0
Uri = (pi − ci)P ∗ri(p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pN ′). (5.26)
We can note that (5.26) is a noncooperative game by the relay nodes, and there
exists a tradeoff between the price pi and the relay node’s utility Uri . If relay node
ri in good channel conditions asks for a relatively low price pi at first, source node
s will buy more power from relay node ri and Uri will increase as pi grows. When
pi keeps growing and exceeds a certain value, it is no longer beneficial for source
s to buy power from relay ri, even though relay ri may be in very good channel
conditions. In this way, Pri will shrink and hence results in a decrement of Uri .
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Therefore, there is an optimal price for each relay node to ask for, depending on
the relay node’s channel conditions. Besides, the optimal price is also affected by
the other relay nodes’ prices since the source node only chooses the most beneficial
relay nodes.




= P ∗ri + (pi − ci)
∂P ∗ri
∂pi
= 0, ri ∈ Lh. (5.27)




2, {Gs,ri}, {Gri,d}), ri ∈ Lh. (5.28)
In Section 5.2.1 we assume that the source node transmits with a constant
power. However, if the source node has a lower transmission power, it is willing to
buy more power from the relay nodes in order to obtain a high data rate, and hence
the relay nodes can ask higher prices for helping the source node. On the other
hand, if the source has a higher transmission power, it will buy less power from the
relay nodes and also pay less to them.
5.2.3 Existence of the Equilibrium
In this subsection, we prove that the solution P ∗ri in (5.25) and p
∗
i in (5.28) is
the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) for the proposed game, and show the conditions
for the SE to be optimal by the following properties, proposition, and theorem.
We first define the SE of the proposed game as follows.
Definition 1: P SEri and p
SE
i are the SE of the proposed game, if for every
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ri ∈ L, when pi is fixed,
Us({P SEri }) = sup{Pri}≥0
Us({Pri}),∀ri ∈ L, (5.29)
and for every ri ∈ Lh, when Pri is fixed,
Uri(p
SE
i ) = sup
pi>ci
Uri(pi), ∀ri ∈ Lh. (5.30)
Then, we show that the optimizer P ∗ri of problem (5.13) can be solved by
equating ∂Us
∂Pri
to zero by the following property.
Property 1: The utility function Us of the source node is jointly concave in
{Pri}Ni=1, with Pri ≥ 0, and pi is fixed, ∀i.















































For each relay, by definition, W ′ > 0, Ai > 0, Bi > 0, and Pri ≥ 0. As a result,
∂2Us
∂P 2ri
< 0 and ∂
2Us
∂Pri∂Prj








0, ∀i 6= j. Moreover, Us is continuous in Pri , so when Pri ≥ 0, Us is strictly concave
in each Pri , ∀i, and jointly concave over {Pri}Ni=1 as well.
N
Due to Property 1, P ∗ri in (5.25) is the global optimum that maximizes the
source node’s utility Us. Therefore, P
∗
ri
satisfies condition (5.29) and is the SE P SEri .
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Moreover, in practical implementation of the game, the source node can find the
optimal power amount by gradually increasing the purchased power from each relay
node until Us reaches its maximum without knowing CSI.
In the following two properties, we show that the relay nodes can not infinitely
increase Uri by asking arbitrarily high prices.
Property 2: The optimal power consumption P ∗ri for relay node ri is decreasing
with its price pi, when other relay nodes’ prices are fixed.




















Y 2 + 4XW ′
)]
< 0. (5.33)
So P ∗ri is decreasing with pi. This is because when some relay node individually
increases its price while the others keep the same prices as before, the source node
will buy less from that relay node. N
Consequently, there is a tradeoff for each relay node to ask a proper price, and
we can solve the optimal price by equating
∂Uri
∂pi
= 0, the reason of which is shown
as follows.
Property 3: The utility function Uri of each relay node is concave in its own
price pi, when its power consumption is the optimized purchase amount from the
source node as calculated in (5.25), and the other relay nodes’ prices are fixed.
Proof. P ∗ri is a continuous function of pi, so Uri is continuous in pi too. Taking
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√
piAiBi + 4XW ′
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(−pi − 3ci) + piAiBi
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where Yi = Y −
√
piAiBi. Since Ai, Bi, pi, Yi, ci, X, and W




So Uri is concave with respect to pi. N
Based on Properties 1-3, we can show that the relay rejection criteria stated
in Section 5.2.1 help the source node reject the least beneficial relay nodes in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: The relay rejection criteria described in Section 5.2.1 is neces-
sary and sufficient to exclude the least beneficial relay nodes to the source node. By
necessary, it means that any ri in Lh cannot get further discarded in the following
Uri maximization process; While by sufficient, it means that, even if we keep rj
that satisfies the rejection criteria in Lh, it is still discarded in the following Urj
maximization process.
Proof. We first prove the sufficient part. Assume the relay rejection criteria apply
to some relay node rj, i.e., (
∂Us
∂Prj
) < 0, when Pri = 0, and pi = ci,∀i. Since Us is
concave in {Pri}Ni=1, rj’s optimal power allocation P ∗rj < 0. Suppose source s does
106
not exclude relay rj and in the following price update process, all remaining relay
nodes gradually increase their prices to get more utilities. To prove that the new
resulting P ∗newrj < 0, it suffices to prove ∆P
∗
rj
< 0, where ∆P ∗rj denotes the increase
of P ∗rj when each relay node ri increase pi by a very small positive amount from the
















































Y 2 + 4XW ′
)
< 0, (5.38)






















Without loss of generality, assuming the selected relay nodes generally share similar





































So in the following price increasing process, rj is still discarded by the source node
by observing P ∗newrj < 0.
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Next, we prove the necessary part. In each round, any two relay nodes rk and
ri update their prices in two consecutive steps. First, rk increases its price p
∗
k to
the new optimal p∗newk , then, by (5.37), the resulting P
∗new
ri
is larger than P ∗ri , where
P ∗ri > 0. Thus, P
∗new
ri
> 0, which means ri won’t be discarded if rk increases pk.
Second, after pk is increased, ri increases its own price pi. In (5.34), assuming p̄i is
the price for ri such that P
∗
ri












Y 2 + 4XW ′
2X
→ 0. (5.41)
By Property 3, the optimal price p∗i such that
∂Uri
∂pi
= 0 must satisfy ci < p
∗
i < p̄i.
This means to maximize Uri , ri asks a lower price than p̄i to avoid being rejected
by the source node. N
If relay node ri gets selected by the source node, due to the concavity of Uri
proved in Property 3, ri can always find its optimal price p
∗
i ∈ (ci,∞), and thus
Uri(p
∗
i ) ≥ Uri(pi), ∀ri ∈ Lh. Together with Property 1, we conclude the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The pair of {P ∗ri}Ni=1 in (5.25) and {p∗i }N
′
i=1 in (5.28) are the SE for
the proposed game, where the SE is defined in (5.29) and (5.30).
In the next subsection, we will show that the SE is unique, and the proposed
game converges to the unique SE when each relay node updates its price according
to a simple function.
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5.2.4 Distributed Price Updating
From the previous subsection, one relay node needs to modify its own price,
after the other relay nodes change their prices. Consequently, for every ri ∈ Lh,










with equality holds if and only if pi reaches the optimum.







In order to calculate pi in (5.43), each relay node ri listens to the instantaneous
feedback information about P ∗ri and ∂P
∗
ri
/∂pi from the source node, which is similar
to the needed information exchange in iterative power control [Yat95]. Then, the
updating of the relay nodes’ prices can be described by a vector equality of the form
p = I (p), (5.44)
where p = (p1, · · · , pN ′), with pi denoting relay node ri’s price; I (p) = (I1(p), · · · ,
IN ′(p)), with Ii(p) representing the price competition constraint to ri from the other
relay nodes. Therefore, for the N ′ relay nodes in set Lh with competition constraints
in (5.44), the iterations of the price updating can be expressed as follows,
p(t + 1) = I (p(t)). (5.45)
Remark: If K source nodes, denoted by S = {s1, s2, · · · , sK}, exist in the
network, assuming that the price of relay node ri when it helps source node sk is
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pski with corresponding power P
sk
ri
, then the buyer-level game for each source node
sk is essentially the same as the single-buyer case. However, the seller-level game
becomes more complicated, because now relay node ri needs to choose K prices,




(pski − ci)P skri . (5.46)
If the relay nodes treat all source nodes equally with pski = pi, ∀sk ∈ S, i.e.,
relay node ri asks a uniform price pi no matter which source node it helps, then
utility Uri is simplified as
Uri = (pi − ci)
∑
sk∈S
P skri , (5.47)













However, if the relay nodes treat the source nodes differently, then each relay













Therefore, if there are multiple source nodes in the network, the propose al-
gorithm is still applicable: the buyer-level game of each source node is essentially
the same as the single-source case; the only change is in the seller-level game of the
relay nodes, where the price updating function is modified as in (5.48) or (5.49).
We show next the convergence of the iterations in (5.45) by proving that the
price updating function I (p) is a standard function [Yat95].
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Definition 2: A function I (p) is standard, if for all p ≥ 0, the following
properties are satisfied [Yat95]:
• Positivity: I (p) > 0,
• Monotonicity: If p ≥ p ′, then I (p) ≥ I (p ′),
• Scalability: For all α > 1, αI (p) > I (αp).
Proposition 2: The price updating function I (p) is standard.
Proof. Positivity: By Property 2,
∂P ∗ri
∂pi
< 0. Moreover, if ci > 0 and Pri ≥ 0, then
by the definition of (5.43), Ii(p) ≥ ci > 0. So in real price updating process, each
relay node starts increasing its price from ci.
Scalability: Comparing αI (p) and I (αp) in an element-wise manner, we have








Since α > 1, (α − 1)ci > 0. Then the problem reduces to proving the second term
in the RHS of (5.50) is positive.





























































Thus, to prove the positivity of the second term of RHS of (5.50) is equiva-







< W ′. Since Fi(W ′) is continuous and
differentiable in W ′, we only need to prove ∂Fi
∂W ′ < 0. Expanding
∂Fi









































The first four terms of the RHS of (5.53) are all positive. After extensive numerical
tests for a wide range of parameters when the nodes are randomly located, we
observe that the last term in the square brackets is negative. Then, the ∂Fi
∂W ′ in
(5.53) is less than zero. Therefore, we can claim that αI (p) > I (αp).
Monotonicity: Suppose p and p ′ are different price vectors, and the vector
inequality p ≥ p ′ means pi ≥ p′i, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N ′}. If ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N ′},
Ij([p1 · · · pi · · · pj · · · pN ′ ]) ≥ Ij([p1 · · · p′i · · · pj · · · pN ′ ]), and Ii([p1 · · · pi · · · pj · · · pN ′ ]) ≥
Ii([p1 · · · p′i · · · pj · · · pN ′ ]), then monotonicity can be shown to hold. So the problem
reduces to proving ∂Ij (p)/∂pi ≥ 0 and ∂Ii (p)/∂pi ≥ 0. Expanding and reorganiz-

























































The first term of the RHS of (5.54) is positive, to decide the sign of the second
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term, it suffices to compare the difference of the denominator and numerator of the



































































> 0. Similarly, we can also prove ∂Ii(p)
∂pi
> 0, so monotonicity holds for the
price updating function. Finally, from the above three parts, we prove that the price
updating function is standard. N
In [Yat95], a proof has been given that starting from any feasible initial power
vector p, the power vector I n(p) produced after n iterations of the standard power
control algorithm gradually converges to a unique fixed point. As we have discussed
in Section 5.2.1, it is natural for the relay nodes to initialize the prices as pi = ci,
because lowering pi below ci will result in a negative utility Uri , while by setting pi
above ci, relay node ri may be at the risk of being excluded by the source node at
the very beginning. So we assume that the initial price vector is c = (c1, · · · , cN ′),
where ci is the cost per unit of power for relay node ri, as introduced in eqn.
(14). Therefore, we can conclude that starting from the feasible initial price vector
c = (c1, · · · , cN ′), the iteration of the standard price updating produces a non-
decreasing sequence of price vectors I n(c) that converges to a unique fixed point
p∗.
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From eqn. (37), we know that, for relay node ri ∈ Lh, its utility Uri satisfies
∂Uri
∂pi




source. After the vector I n(p) converges to p∗, no relay can gain a higher utility
by further varying its price, meaning
∂Uri
∂pi
= 0 for ∀ri ∈ Lh. From eqns. (27) and
(28), we know that p∗ is exactly the optimal price vector. As Property 1 shows,
Us is concave in Pri , so the source node can gradually increase the power from 0
and find the optimal P ∗ri . Thus, if the prices of all the selected relay nodes converge
to their optima, then the source node will correspondingly buy the optimal power.
Therefore, once I n(p) converges to p∗, Pri and pi converges to the SE. It is worth
mentioning that although the closed-form solutions {P ∗ri}Ni=1 in (5.25) and {p∗i }N
′
i=1
in (5.28) are functions of the channel-state information, in practical implementation
of the game, the source node can find the optimal power amount by gradually
increasing the purchased power from each relay node until Us reaches its maximum
due to Property 1. Actually the reason why we express the closed-form solution
{P ∗ri}Ni=1 as a function of CSI is just to show that the relay node’s utility Uri is
concave in pi (Property 3 ), and hence to prove that the relay nodes can utilize
the proposed price updating algorithm and gradually converge to the optimal price
{p∗i }N ′i=1 (Proposition 2 ). Hence, the only signallings between an individual relay
node and the source node are the instant price and corresponding power, and no
CSI is needed. Moreover, there is no price information exchange between the relay
nodes. Therefore, the proposed game achieves its equilibrium in a distributed way
with local information.
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5.2.5 Comparison with the Centralized Optimal Scheme
In order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed game-theoretic scheme,
we first investigate a centralized optimal power allocation problem with closed-form
solutions. Then, we illustrate the numerical comparison of the performance in Sec-
tion 5.3.
Suppose the system resources are shared by all available N relay nodes. From

















Pri ≤ P totr , 0 ≤ Pri ≤ Pmaxri ∀i,
where Γs,d and Γs,ri,d are defined in (5.3) and (5.8) respectively.
Because log2(1 + x) is a strictly increasing function of x, reorganizing the












































l, x < l;
x, l ≤ x ≤ u;
u, u < x.
(5.59)
In order to make a fair comparison, in the proposed scheme, we can change
a, the gain per unit of the rate, to equivalently reflect different P totr constraints as
in the centralized scheme. The reason is explained as follows. When a is so large
that the total payment M in Us is negligible, Us ≈ aRs,r,d, then the optimal power
consumption of the problem in (5.13) will be P ∗ri → ∞. It is equivalent to have
P totr → ∞ in the centralized scheme. On the contrary, when a is so small that
the total gain of the rate aRs,r,d in Us is negligible, Us ≈ −M = −
∑
i piPri , then
in this case we get P ∗ri = 0. It is equivalent to have P
tot
r = 0 in the centralized
scheme. Therefore, by varying a in a large range, we can get the optimal achievable
rates corresponding to different total power consumptions and fairly compare the
performance with that of the centralized scheme2.
In the following, we sketch the analytical comparison between the centralized
optimization scheme and the proposed distributed game. First, according to (5.56),
we can represent the Lagrangian of the centralized optimal scheme as follows,










Pri − P totr ),
(5.60)
where the Lagrangian multipliers are λ = (λ1, · · · , λN+1), and ν = (ν1, · · · , νN),
with λi, νi ≥ 0. In the proposed game, each node maximizes its own utility defined
in eq. (5.13) and (5.15), so we can equivalently view the objective as a vector
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s.t 0 ≤ Pri ≤ Pmaxri , i = 1, · · · , N, (5.62)
pi ≥ 0, i = 1, · · · , N, (5.63)
where w = (w1, · · · , wN) is any weight vector, and wi > 0, ∀i. Similarly, we can
express the Lagrangian for the scalarized optimization as













λ̃i(Pri − Pmaxri ),
(5.64)
where the Lagrangian multipliers are λ̃ = (λ̃1, · · · , λ̃N), µ̃ = (µ̃1, · · · , µ̃N), and
ν̃ = (ν̃1, · · · , ν̃N), with λ̃i, µ̃i, ν̃i ≥ 0, ∀i.
Substituting (5.13) and (5.15) into (5.64), after some manipulation, L̃game(Pr,
p, λ̃, ν̃, µ̃) becomes
L̃game(Pr,p, λ̃, ν̃, µ̃) =aRs,r,d +
N∑
i=1










λ̃i(Pri − Pmaxri ).
(5.65)
Since a > 0 and for simplicity, the above Lagrangian can be further converted
to
L̃′game(Pr,p, λ, ν, µ) =Rs,r,d +
N∑
i=1


















(Pri − Pmaxri ).
(5.66)
Comparing eq. (5.60) and (5.66), we can find they have similar terms, which can be
viewed as one-to-one mappings, i.e., λi ↔ λ̃ia , νi ↔ ν̃ia , and λN+1(
∑N
i=1 Pri −P totr ) ↔
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(a) Optimal power in game











−3 Relay power vs Pr
















(b) Optimal power in centralized scheme























(c) Optimal power in game (Pri ≤ Pmaxri )



























(d) Optimal power in centralized
scheme(Pri ≤ Pmaxri )









. Without loss of generality, let us view a
as a parameter in the proposed game, and correspondingly P totr a parameter in the
centralized optimal scheme. When a increases, 1
a
(∑N




decreases. In order to map λN+1(
∑N
i=1 Pri − P totr ) to it, P totr should increase. That
is the reason why varying the parameter a in the proposed game is equivalent to
varying P totr in the centralized optimization. To justify our claim, we show the opti-
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mal powers versus P totr and a of the two schemes in Figure 5.2, with or without the
Pmaxri constraints, respectively. From both the simulation and the above analysis,
we can see that due to the equivalence of the Lagrangian in the two approaches,
the proposed game can achieve comparable performance to that in the centralized
optimal scheme.
However, the centralized optimal power allocation scheme needs considerable
overheads and signaling, because it requires that the complete channel-state infor-
mation (CSI), i.e., Gs,d, Gs,ri and Gri,d available. In Section 5.3, we show that our
proposed distributed scheme can achieve comparable performance while the needed
signaling between the source node and the relay nodes is only the information about
the prices and the power consumptions.
5.3 Simulation Studies
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, in what follows, the
simulation results for a one-relay case, for a two-relay case, and for a multiple-relay
case are to be shown. Then we provide the performance comparisons of the proposed
approach with the centralized optimal scheme. Finally, we discuss the effect of the
bandwidth factor.
2We do not include explicitly the constraints on the relay nodes’ power in the proposed game
for ease of analysis. From the simulation in the next section and analytical proof in Appendix
??, it will be shown that the game will achieve comparable performance when we consider the
constraints on relay nodes’ power.
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5.3.1 One-Relay Case
There are one source-destination node pair (s, d) and one relay node r in the
network. Destination node d is located at coordinate (0m, 0m), and source node s
is located at coordinate (100m, 0m). We fix the y-coordinate of relay node r at 25m
and its x-coordinate varies within the range of [−250m, 300m]. The propagation loss
factor is set to 2. The transmit power Ps = 10mW, the noise level is σ
2 = 10−8W,
and we select the capacity gap Γ = 1, W = 1MHz, the gain per unit of rate a = 0.01
and the cost per unit of power c = 0.2.
In Figure 5.3(a), we show the optimal price for relay node r and the optimal
power bought by source node s, respectively. In this simulation, relay node r moves
along a line. We observe that when relay node r is close to source node s at
(100m, 0m), the source can gain a higher Us in the game, so the relay can more
efficiently help source node s. However, the relay cannot arbitrarily select its price
in order to improve its utility. As we have shown in Property 2 and Property 3, the
optimal power P ∗r the source buys from relay node r is decreasing with p, and node
ri’s utility Uri is concave in p. Since the objective of the relay node is to maximize
its utility Ur, the price p should be carefully selected instead of an arbitrarily large
value. As decreasing price p can attract more buying from the source, relay node
r reduces its price to enhance its utility Ur. When relay node r moves close to
destination node d at (0m, 0m), relay node r can use very small amount of power
to relay source node s’s data, so relay node r sets a very high price in order to get
more profits by selling this small amount of power. However, even the price is higher
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(a) Optimal price and power of the relay node






















source node’s utility U
s
relay node’s utility U
r
(b) Optimal utility of the relay and the source node
Figure 5.3: 1-relay case with the relay node at different locations.
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than that when r is closer to the source, the utility Ur is still lower when the relay
is close to the destination. When relay node r keeps moving away from destination
node d, source node s stops buying services because asking for relay node r’s help
is no longer beneficial to source node s. Similarly, when relay node r moves in the
opposite direction and locates far away from source node s, s would not buy services
either.
In Figure 5.3(b), we show, respectively, the optimal utilities relay node r and
source node s can obtain using the proposed game. When relay node r is close to
source node s, both r and s can get their maximal utilities. The reason is that
around this location, relay node r can most efficiently help source node s increase
its utility, and the optimal price of relay node r is lower than that when r is at other
locations. So source node s buys more power, resulting in a higher utility to relay
node r.
5.3.2 Two-Relay Case
We also set up two-relay simulations to test the proposed game. In the simu-
lations, the coordinates of s and d are (100m, 0m) and (0m, 0m), respectively. Relay
node r1 is fixed at the coordinate (50m, 25m) and relay node r2 moves along the line
from (−250m, 25m) to (300m, 25m). For each ri, we set ci = 0.1. Other settings are
the same as those of the one-relay case.
In Figure 5.4, we can observe that even though only r2 moves, the prices of
both the relay nodes change accordingly, and s buys different amounts of power
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(a) Optimal prices of the relay nodes




















(b) Optimal power consumptions of the relay
nodes























(c) Optimal utilities of the relay nodes

























(d) Us and M of the source node
Figure 5.4: 2-relay case with relay node r2 at different locations.
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from them. This fact is because the relay nodes influence and compete with each
other in the proposed game. When relay node r2 is close to d at (0m, 0m), it sets
a very high price as explained in the one-relay case. Accordingly, r1 increases its
price and P ∗r1 slightly decreases. When r2 is close to s at (100m, 0m), r2 is more
suitable to help s than r1, and U
∗
r2
is very high. Hence, in order to attract source s
to buy its service, r1 reduces its price a lot, but U
∗
r1
still drops. Because r2 close to
s results in the most efficient help to s from the relay nodes, both Us and M reach
their maxima around this location. As r2 moves far away from s or d, r2’s price
drops because r2 is less competitive than r1. When its utility is less than 0, r2 quits
the competition and P ∗r2 = 0mW. At that moment, r1 can slightly increase its price
since there is no competition. However, source node s will buy slightly less power
from r1. This fact suppresses the incentive of r1 to ask arbitrarily high price in the
absence of competition, otherwise r2 will rejoin the competition. At the transition
point when r2 quits, Ur1 is smooth. Note that when r2 moves to (50m, 25m), the
same location as r1, the power consumptions, the prices and the utilities of both the
relay nodes are the same. This is because the source node is indifferent for the two
relay nodes locating together and treats them equally.
5.3.3 Multiple-Relay Case
We then set up multiple-relay simulations to test the proposed game. The coor-
dinates of the source node and the destination node are (100m, 0m) and (0m, 0m), re-
spectively, and the relay nodes are uniformly located within the range of [−50m, 150m]
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(a) Average price and power vs. number of relay nodes




























Average M and U
s




















(b) Average Us and M vs. number of relay nodes
Figure 5.5: Multiple-relay case with different number of relay nodes.
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in x-axis and [0m, 20m] in y-axis. From Figure 5.5, we can observe that as the to-
tal number of the available relay nodes increases, the competitions among the relay
nodes become more severe, so the average price per relay node decreases. The source
node increases the amount of average power purchase when the number of the relay
nodes is not so large (less than 3), because the average price is decreased. When
the number of the relay nodes becomes larger (greater than 3), the source node
decreases the amount of average power purchase, because it buys power from more
relay nodes. Correspondingly, the total payments are shared by more relay nodes,
which leads to less average payment from the source node. Thus, the source node
obtains an increasing utility.
5.3.4 Convergence Speed of the Game
As described in Section 5.2.4, the relay nodes start increasing their price pi
from ci after the N
′ more beneficial relay nodes have been selected by the source
node. Denote the price vector at time t as p(t) = (p1(t), p2(t), · · · , pN ′(t)). From
(5.25), the optimal power purchased by the source node at time t can be denoted as
P ∗ri(t) := P
∗
ri
(p(t)) = P ∗ri(p1(t), p2(t), · · · , pN ′(t)). (5.67)
In order to obtain ∂P ∗ri/∂pi and update their prices by (5.43), the selected relay
nodes will simultaneously increase each pi(t) by a small amount δi. The source node
































(a) Prices of relay nodes vs. iteration index
































 vs. number of iterations
a=1
a=0.2
(b) Difference in Rs,r,d vs. iteration index

























(c) Prices of relay nodes vs. iteration index (3
relays)























(d) Prices of relay nodes vs. iteration index (4
relays)
Figure 5.6: Observation of convergence speed.
Substituting the above approximation signalled from the source node into (5.43),
where the numerator P ∗ri(t) is as defined in (5.67), the relay nodes can obtain
p(t + 1) = I(p(t)). In the above updating process, the source node can signal
the approximated derivatives calculated by (5.68) to all the relay nodes at one time,
and need not interact with them one by one. So this process can be viewed as one
iteration, and does not depend on the number of relay nodes. Then we conducted
simulations when 2 to 4 relay nodes are available to help the source node, and ob-
serve the convergence behavior of the proposed game. In Figure 5.6(a), it is seen
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that the proposed scheme has fast convergence to the Stackelberg Equilibria p∗. It
takes less than 15 iterations until the price vector p converges to the optimum when
there are 2 relay nodes in the system for a = 1, where a denotes the gain per unit
of rate as defined in (5.11), and less than 10 iterations for a = 0.2. In addition,
in Figure 5.6(b), the convergence behavior of Rs,r,d to the optimized transmission
rate using Pr
∗ and p∗ appears to be exponentially fast. Finally, we keep a = 1,
increase the number of relay nodes to 3 and 4, and show the convergence behavior
of the prices in Figure 5.6(c) and 5.6(d), respectively. We can see the number of
iterations until convergence happens almost keeps the same as there are more relay
nodes existing in the system.
5.3.5 Comparison with the Centralized Optimal Scheme
To compare the performance of the proposed game with the centralized scheme,
we set up two simulations as follows. There are two relay nodes and one (s, d) pair.
One of the relay nodes is fixed at coordinate (50m, 25m) and the other node is fixed at
(60m, 25m) and (40m, 25m) in the two simulations, respectively. For the centralized
scheme defined in (5.56), we set Pmaxri = 10mW, and let P
tot
r vary within the range of
[10, 20]mW. Then, we can obtain a curve of the maximal rates versus different total
power consumption constraints. For the distributed scheme, as explained in Section
5.2.5, by varying a and including the same constraint Pmaxri = 10mW on Pri , we can
also get different total power consumptions and corresponding maximal rates. From
Figure 5.7(a) and 5.7(b), we observe that the proposed game achieves almost equal
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(a) x-coordinate of r2 = 60m






























(b) x-coordinate of r2 = 40m
Figure 5.7: Optimal rate in distributed and centralized schemes.
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rates as the centralized scheme under the same total power consumptions.
5.3.6 Effect of the Bandwidth Factor
As explained in Section 5.1.1, for the network with a limited bandwidth, the
bandwidth should be divided for the source node and the relay nodes. If N ′ out of
the total N available relay nodes are selected by the source node, where N ′ ≤ N ,
then γL =
1
N ′+1 in (5.10), indicating the bandwidth factor decreases as more relay
nodes help the source node. Thus, using less relay nodes among the selected N ′ relay
nodes may further increase Us for the source node. Therefore, for the networks with
a limited bandwidth, it is not sufficient for the source node to implement only one
round of relay selection. Instead, after source node s selects N ′ relay nodes using
the relay rejection criteria, s continues to try different subsets of the N ′ selected
relay nodes, get the corresponding optimal utility U∗s for each trial, and choose the
subset of relay nodes that results in the largest U∗s . In this subsection, we set up
simulations to observe the effect of the varying bandwidth factor.
We set a = 0.85, relay node r1 is at (100m, 5m), and r2 moves along the line
between points (−250m, 5m) and (300m, 5m). In Figure 5.8, we show the optimal U∗s
obtained by the source node under four scenarios, i.e., when no relay node, only r1,
only r2, and both relay nodes are available to help, respectively. We see that when r2
moves close to r1 and the source node s, i.e., the x-coordinate of r2 lies in the interval
of (85m, 115m), both r2 and r1 are beneficial to node s. Moreover, as explained in
the multiple-relay case in Section 5.3.3, since there is competition between two relay
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Figure 5.8: Optimal Us including the bandwidth-factor effect, with different relay
nodes’ help, a = 0.85.
nodes, the average power bought from the relay node is much greater, while the
average payment is lower, compared with the 1-relay case. Hence, although γL is
only 1/3, Us(r1, r2) is still greater than Us(rionly), for i = 1, 2, and both relay nodes
are selected. When r2 moves farther away from s, r2 is less beneficial, asks a higher
price, and r1 is also influenced to ask a higher price. So Us(r1, r2) decreases, and
becomes smaller than Us(r1only) where γL is 1/2. So choosing r1 only is better
than choosing both relay nodes. When r2 keeps moving away from s, it is no longer
beneficial for the source node s to select it to help. So r2 will be rejected, and the
bandwidth factor jumps from 1/3 to 1/2. So there are two bumps of Us(r1, r2) when
the x-coordinate of r2 is about -70m and 140m.
131
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a game-theoretic approach for distributed resource
allocation over multiuser cooperative communication networks. We target for an-
swering two questions: who will be the relays and how much power for the relays to
transmit for the cooperative transmission. We employ a Stackelberg (buyer/seller)
game to jointly consider the benefits of the source node and the relay nodes. The
proposed scheme not only helps the source node optimally choose the relay nodes
at better locations but also helps the competing relay nodes ask optimal prices
to maximize their utilities. From the simulation results, relay nodes closer to the
source node can play a more important role in increasing the source node’s utility,
so the source node buys more power from these preferred relay nodes. If the total
number of the available relay nodes increases, the source node can obtain a greater
utility value and the average payment to the relay nodes shrinks, due to more severe
competitions among the relay nodes. It is also shown that the distributed resource
allocation can achieve comparable performance to that of the centralized scheme,
without requiring knowledge of CSI. The proposed Stackelberg-game based frame-
work can be extended as a building block in large-scale wireless ad hoc networks to
stimulate cooperation among distributed nodes.
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Chapter 6
Attacks in Spectrum Sensing
In the Chapter 4, we have analyzed the spectrum sensing game assuming that
all secondary users are selfish by pursuing as high a throughput as possible. But we
assume they will not cause damage to each other. However, it is highly possible that
the secondary users are operating in a hostile environment, where malicious users
intend to attack the legitimate secondary system by interrupting spectrum sensing.
In this chapter, we investigate possible attacks on cooperative spectrum sensing,
analyze their damages, and compare the throughput performance of the spectrum
sensing game with that of individual sensing without cooperation.
6.1 Mask Primary User Signal
As we have discussed in Chapter 3, in dynamic spectrum access, it is usually
required that secondary users’ operation should not conflict or interfere with pri-
mary users. Otherwise, a primary user will prohibit secondary users from utilizing
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the primary band if the detection probability falls below a predetermined threshold
P̄D. This requirement poses vulnerabilities in spectrum sensing if the legitimate sec-
ondary users are induced to cause interference with the primary user [BS08]. From
the malicious attackers’ viewpoint, if they can reduce the received primary signal
strength of the legitimate secondary users, or raise the noise level, the legitimate
users will have greater difficulty in distinguishing between the primary user signal
and noise. This in turn increases the probability of false alarm, and thus the aver-
age throughput of the legitimate secondary users will get reduced according to the
definition in (4.9).
Specifically, if the malicious users increase the noise power on every detection
of the legitimate secondary user from σ2w to σ̃
2
w, in order to guarantee the same







+ γ̃ + 1
]
σ̃2w, (6.1)
with γ̃ = |h|
2σ2s
σ̃2w
being the received SNR of the primary user under attack. Substi-
tuting this threshold to (4.3), we get the false alarm probability when the primary
signal is masked as
P̃F (P̄D, N, γ̃) = Q
(√





We can see from (6.2) that when the malicious users induce the legitimate
secondary users to interfere with the primary users, the false alarm probability
becomes higher, and the damage to the legitimate users will depend on the noise
power. However, even when the primary signal is masked by the malicious users, the
legitimate users who join in the cooperative sensing game still have a greater chance
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of achieving a higher throughput than those sensing the primary user individually,
because more users are available to share the time spent in sensing. We will show
the comparison via simulations in the next section.
6.2 Report Faulty Sensory Data
Since the cooperative spectrum sensing requires local detection reports from
all contributing secondary users and a certain decision fusion rule to make a fi-
nal judgement, another effective attack is to distort sensory data, especially when
the legitimate secondary users only have limited information about the primary
users’ activity/operation pattern. Although in a centralized cognitive radio network,
public-key authentication and digital signature mechanism [BS08] can validate the
source and integrity of the reported information, verifying distributed cooperative
users would be much more difficult. The malicious users can report by themselves,
or compromise the legitimate secondary users to report, faulty sensory data, which
can lead to belief manipulation [CG08]. Since the legitimate secondary users will
adjust their strategies through strategic interactions, the manipulated beliefs will be
distributed throughout the cognitive radio network, resulting in suboptimal perfor-
mance. In the following, we analyze the damage to the legitimate secondary users
of this attack.
Without loss of generality, we assume Ka malicious users share the total K
sub-bands with another K−Ka legitimate secondary users. Majority rule is adopted
as the decision fusion rule. To degrade the throughput by increasing the false alarm
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probability of the legitimate secondary users, the Ka malicious user pretend to be
very active in contributing to sensing while always report the presence of the primary
user (H1) in every detection without taking any real samples of the primary signal.
Denote the set formed by the legitimate secondary users who contribute to sensing
as Sgc . By assuming each contributor takes equal responsibility in making the final
decision, i.e., PD,si is identical for any user si, we obtain the detection probability















because the legitimate users are made to believe Ka users would always contribute
to sensing. From (6.3) we can solve the required P̄D,si , and get the false alarm
probability for any user si as
PF,si = Q
(√





With majority rule, the false alarm probability after decision fusion is given by
PF (S
g
c ) = P
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Since the Ka malicious users always report H1 in every detection to increase the
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If the legitimate secondary users are clustering together, we can assume they have
















Similar to the analysis in Section 4.2.3, the payoff functions for the legitimate sec-
ondary users defined in (4.10)-(4.12) for a symmetric game setting become
U gC(|Sgc |) = U0(Sgc )(1−
τ
Ka + |Sgc |), (6.8)
and
U gD(|Sgc |) = U0(Sgc ), (6.9)
where U0(S
g







PH0 [1− PF (Sgc )]C, if |Sgc | ∈ [Ka + 1, K −Ka];
0, if |Sgc | ∈ [0, Ka + 1].
(6.10)
Then, the average payoff for a legitimate user taking pure strategy C under




xjg(1− xg)K−Ka−1−jU gC(j + 1), (6.11)
where xg denotes the probability that a legitimate secondary user contributes to
spectrum sensing when there exist malicious users reporting faulty sensory informa-





xjg(1− xg)K−Ka−1−jU gD(j). (6.12)
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We can solve the ESS by equating (6.11) and (6.12). Since the payoff functions share
similar form to those without malicious users, it can be expected that the dynamics
defined in (4.17) converge to the ESS in this case as well. We will show the ESS
after convergence and the resulting average throughput for the legitimate secondary
users in the following section.
6.3 Simulation Studies
In this section, we illustrate the ESS and the average throughput performance
for each legitimate secondary user in a homogeneous sensing game with malicious
users.
Figure 6.1 shows the case when the primary signal is masked by the malicious
user, where the average received SNR is reduced from −12 dB to −19 dB. We
see from the figure that the ESS probability of cooperation is almost the same as
that with no malicious users. However, as the received SNR of the primary user
is reduced, the legitimate users have greater difficulty in correctly detecting the
primary user’s activity, and the average throughput gets heavily reduced. In order
to obtain more precise detection and reduce false alarm, the legitimate users have to
collect more samples, so the optimal value of τ increases from around 0.25 to around
0.55. As more users are available to share the sensing cost, the average throughput
per user in the sensing game is still higher than the single-user sensing under attack.
In Figure 6.2, we show the case where 2 malicious users share a total of K
sub-bands with K − 2 legitimate secondary users. We vary K in the range of [5,11]
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(a) Probability of being a contributor






































(b) Average throughput per legitimate user
Figure 6.1: ESS and average throughput vs. τ when the primary signal is masked.
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(a) Probability of being a contributor




































(b) Average throughput per legitimate user
Figure 6.2: ESS and average throughput vs. τ when 2 malicious users report faulty
sensory data.
140
and observe the ESS probability of cooperation in Figure 6.2(a) and the average
throughput in Figure 6.2(b). We find that when there are only a few (3 or 4)
legitimate users, the faulty sensory data from the malicious users overwhelms the
correct information from the legitimate users, which makes the legitimate users
believe the primary user is always present and the degree of cooperation of the
legitimate users become 0. Since the belief of the legitimate users are manipulated,
the false alarm probability approaches 1, and the average throughput is 0. However,
when there are more than 4 legitimate users (i.e., K ≥ 7), the faulty sensory data
cannot dominate the decision fusion, and the legitimate users obtain an average
throughput greater than 0. It is interesting that due to the high false alarm created
by the malicious users, the legitimate users will become more cooperative than the
case with no malicious users, because only by more cooperation can the legitimate
users collect more precise sensory data, maintain a lower false alarm probability,
and efficiently utilize the spectrum opportunity.
We illustrate in Figure 6.3 the scenario where 3 malicious users share a total
of K sub-bands with K− 3 legitimate secondary users, with K varying in the range
of [7,13]. We find that as more malicious users exist in the sensing game, more
legitimate users (greater than 8, or K ≥ 12) are needed to combat the damage of
the malicious users, and their probability of cooperation is also higher than that
when there exist no malicious users. In both Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3, we also
compare the average throughput of the legitimate users in the sensing game under
attack to that of the single-user sensing where his/her decision is not affected by the
malicious users. We find that as long as there are a plenty of legitimate users who
141




























(a) Probability of being a contributor




































(b) Average throughput per legitimate user
Figure 6.3: ESS and average throughput vs. τ when 3 malicious users report faulty
sensory data.
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collectively collect enough samples of the primary signal (about τ > 0.4), joining in
the sensing game is still a better choice for the legitimate users than the single-user
sensing, because each user can spend less time in sensing while not badly affected
by the malicious users’ faulty sensory data.
6.4 Summary
In order to avoid conflict with primary users, spectrum sensing has become an
essential functionality of cognitive radios. However, malicious attacks can severely
deteriorates the performance of spectrum sensing.In this chapter, we investigate
possible attacks on cooperative spectrum sensing under the evolutionary sensing
game framework, and analyze their damage both theoretically and by simulations.
Simulation results show that if the primary signal is masked by the malicious users,
the legitimate secondary users need to collectively take more samples to obtain
a better throughput; if malicious users exchange false sensory data to interrupt
decision fusion, more legitimate users are required and they should behave more
cooperatively so as to dominate the false sensory data. It is also shown that the
evolutionary sensing game can still achieve better throughput than that of individual
sensing without cooperation under malicious attacks.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we have studied how to design efficient spectrum allocation
scheme in cognitive cooperative wireless networks. We focus on studying the optimal
collaboration strategy of selfish users in forwarding information and cooperative
spectrum sensing for detecting primary users using a game-theoretic framework,
and dynamic spectrum access with statistical modeling that can predict future traffic
patterns and optimize system throughput.
First, we have developed a statistical modeling approach that characterizes the
traffic dynamics for opportunistic spectrum access in licensed spectrum. In order
to improve the spectrum utilization efficiency, secondary users are allowed to access
the spectrum white space in a licensed band. However, if they access the licensed
spectrum too greedily, their throughput will be heavily reduced due to interference
or collisions. Further, dynamics caused by different user activities, e.g., primary
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user re-occupying/vacating the licensed band and secondary users starting/ceasing
a communication session, make it more challenging to optimize spectrum efficiency
in real-time. In this dissertation, we model the traffic variations of the radio envi-
ronment as CTMC that can predict future traffic patterns in the share spectrum.
By optimizing spectrum access probabilities, throughput degradation due to inter-
ference is compensated.
Second, we have investigated how to collaborate in cooperative spectrum sens-
ing for primary user detection. In cooperative spectrum sensing, it may not be opti-
mal to have all secondary users cooperate in every sensing effort. Moreover, sensing
takes energy/time which may be used for data transmission. In self-organizing net-
works, where different secondary users belong to different network controllers and
exchange their local sensory data to make a final decision, the selfish users tend to
overhear the other’s sensing outcomes to reserve more time for their own data trans-
mission. In this dissertation, we study the time evolution of selfish users’ cooperation
behavior and propose an evolutionary cooperative sensing game that converges to
the ESS. With the proposed game, we can obtain the optimal number of cooperating
users only based on users’ own observation of their past throughput. Moreover, the
performance of ESS is better than that having all users always cooperate.
Third, we have studied how to enforce cooperation between source nodes and
relay nodes in cooperative wireless networks. Most existing works on resource alloca-
tion in cooperative networks assume all users belong to the same central authority
that can collect precise CSI of different channels and allocate network resources
to different users. In this dissertation we present a distributed relay selection and
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power control scheme using Stackelberg game, without requiring a central authority.
In the proposed game-theoretic framework, source nodes can find relay nodes that
can better improve the source nodes’ throughput with less cost, and relay nodes
can maximize their revenues from forwarding source nodes’ information as well. In
addition, there is no need to measure and exchange CSI, since relay nodes can adapt
their prices according to the proposed price updating function, which is easy to im-
plement and guaranteed to converge to the optimal operating point. Therefore, the
proposed Stackelberg game reduces communication overhead greatly that is usually
involved in conventional cooperative wireless networking. Moreover, the proposed
scheme is a good candidate for cooperation stimulation in large-scale wireless ad
hoc networks, where users controlled by different operators only aim at maximizing
their own performance.
Finally, we have investigated possible attacks on cooperative spectrum sens-
ing. Since it is highly possible that the secondary users are operating in a hostile
environment, malicious users intend to attack the legitimate secondary system by
interrupting spectrum sensing. In this dissertation, we studied possible attacks on
cooperative spectrum sensing under the evolutionary game framework, analyze their
damages, and compare the throughput performance of the spectrum sensing game
with that of individual sensing without cooperation. It is shown that the evolution-
ary sensing game can still achieve better throughput than that of individual sensing
without cooperation under malicious attacks.
146
7.2 Future Work
In this dissertation, we have addressed several critical issues in efficient spec-
trum allocation design for cognitive cooperative networks, where we mainly assume
that users will not do harm to others. However, in practical wireless networks, not
all users will behave well and there exist malicious users who may cause damage
to other users and even ruin the network. Therefore, efficient spectrum allocation
cannot be made possible without considering security enforcement. In this section,
we will list some of the security issues that we would like to address in our future
research.
We plan to continue investigating various security enforcement schemes in
spectrum sensing. Since primary user detection is very sensitive to noise uncertainty,
malicious users in the vicinity of legitimate users may inject jamming pulses to make
primary user detection more difficult. In cooperative spectrum sensing, secondary
users exchange their local sensing outcomes and make a final decision using some
decision fusion rule. Thus, besides always reporting a primary user’s existence,
malicious users can adaptively manipulate their sensory data so that legitimate
users can hardly detect the re-appearance of a primary user, conflict with it and
have difficulty in recognizing the malicious users. In addition, during a sensing
period, all users should stop their transmission and listen to the licensed spectrum.
Malicious users can mimic the primary user signal in the sensing periods so as to
waste the spectrum opportunity. Therefore, we would like to investigate possible
attacks in spectrum sensing, characterize the symptoms when spectrum sensing is
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disturbed by malicious users, locate the malicious users, and exclude them from the
network.
We will also be interested in studying how to secure spectrum allocation and
sharing in different network layers. As secondary users may occupy multiple under-
used licensed bands, whenever the current channel conditions become worse or a
primary user re-appears, they need to re-select a proper spectrum band (i.e., spec-
trum handoff) to resume transmission and guarantee reliable and seamless commu-
nication. If a legitimate user is compromised by malicious users and distorts the
signaling when exchanging information for spectrum handoff, not only may packet
error rate and latency increase, but the other transmitting users may also get im-
paired during the frequency change. Therefore, we plan to systematically investigate
how to design optimal spectrum allocation when there exist inside malicious attack-
ers. In addition, in order to perform spectrum allocation and spectrum handoff
within a network, certain control information should be broadcast to all network
users through a dedicated channel. If control channels are jammed by malicious
users that transmit junk packets using very high power, all information about spec-
trum allocation will be lost, and the entire secondary network will not function
normally. Hence, we plan to design robust spectrum allocation where the channel
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